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463 
UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION:1 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN CASH AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For public libraries, it’s a tough choice – one that pits the First 
Amendment against the need for cold cash; either way, library patrons 
will be the ones who feel the impact.2  Of the 143 million Americans 
who use the Internet regularly, ten percent rely solely on access at a 
public library.3  This Note addresses the recent U. S. Supreme Court 
case of United States v. American Library Association in which the 
Court upheld the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA),4 which 
mandates that libraries receiving any federal funding install filters on 
every computer in the library.5  CIPA is Congress’s response to a 
perceived problem of patrons using federally-funded Internet access at 
public libraries to access pornography and obscene materials.6  Through 
CIPA, Congress decided it could restrict children’s access to such 
unsavory material by denying federal funding unless libraries installed 
 
 1. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 2. Charity Vogel, Internet Filter Ruling Puts Libraries in the Hot Seat, BUFFALO NEWS, 
June 24, 2003, at B1 (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n on library patrons in Western New York). 
 3. Charles Lane, Ruling Backs Porn Filters in Libraries, WASHINGTON POST, June 24, 2003, 
at A01.  Some 95 percent of all U.S. public libraries offer Internet access, and federal aid has been a 
crucial factor in this expansion. Id.  See also Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 199-200 
(acknowledging that the subsidies and discounts at issue in the case have succeeded greatly in 
bringing Internet access to public libraries). 
 4. Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000) (codified at 20 USC 9134 (2001) and 47 U.S.C. 254(h) (2001)). 
 5. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. CIPA’s provisions also apply to libraries in 
public schools, but only public libraries were challenged in this case.  Id. 
 6. S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 2-6 (1999) (discussing at length the problems of intentional and 
accidental access to sexually explicit material on the Internet, the harm to children of exposure, and 
increasing incidents related to on-line pedophiles). But see Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and 
Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access 
to Internet Pornography in Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 235-36 (2003) (stating that the 
scope of the problem of children accessing or accidentally viewing Internet pornography varies 
widely depending on which study is consulted). 
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the filters.7  If the Internet filters worked effectively, no constitutional 
problem would arise, as the materials targeted for blocking are not 
constitutionally protected.8  However, due to limitations on technology, 
filters cannot block only the targeted materials.9  In fact, the filters 
“over-block” – keeping adult patrons from accessing constitutionally 
protected material.10 
This Note discusses the possibility that the Court, in its eagerness to 
protect children, twisted established First Amendment doctrines to 
uphold CIPA and declined to address other legal issues that weaken 
CIPA’s constitutionality.  Part II provides a historical background of 
previous legislation attempting to protect children accessing the Internet, 
explains what CIPA is and compares it to previous legislation, and also 
discusses current filtering technology and its limitations.11  Part III 
provides a statement of the facts, including the procedural history of the 
case.12  Part IV analyzes the Court’s confusing and inconsistent 
application of firmly established rules dealing with Congress’ spending 
power, First Amendment forum analysis, and the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.13  In addition, this section presents flaws not 
addressed by the Court, including Congress’s attempted usurpation of 
States’ rights through CIPA14 and libraries’ inability to comply with 
CIPA’s requirements.15  Part IV concludes with the potential aftermath 
of the Court’s ruling as it affects both the average library patron and the 
legal community attempting to rely on Supreme Court precedent.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Congress v. Judiciary: Defining the Line Between Free Speech & 
Obscenity on the Internet 
Prior to Congress enacting laws specifically dealing with the 
 
 7. See S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 6-7 (observing that Internet filtering can provide an effective 
means of protecting children from harmful materials).  See also infra notes 46-58 and 
accompanying text regarding CIPA’s implementation. 
 8. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (observing that obscene speech has 
long been held to fall outside of the purview of the First Amendment). 
 9. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text discussing filtering and its limitations. 
 10. See infra notes 65-69. 
 11. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 70-113 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 114-50 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 177-92 and accompanying text. 
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Internet, statutes already existed that prohibited the transmission of 
obscenity and pornography,17 neither of which is protected by the First 
Amendment.18  Legislators responded to the growing public concern 
over Internet pornography by enacting the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA).19  CDA criminalized the knowing transmission of obscene 
or offensive material to a person under 18 years of age and imposed a 
fine or imprisonment as a penalty.20  In ACLU v. Reno,21 a variety of 
organizations22 immediately challenged the CDA on constitutional 
grounds.23  After a three-judge panel agreed with the plaintiffs and 
enjoined enforcement,24 the government appealed as a matter of right to 
 
 17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-1465 (2003) (criminalizing the transmission of obscenity); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251-2252 (2003) (criminalizing the transmission of pornography). 
 18. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that First Amendment protection 
does not extend to obscene material). The Court concluded that the regulation of obscenity must be 
specifically defined and is limited to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. Further, the 
Miller test limited obscenity “to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not 
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” and is to be evaluated based on 
“contemporary community standards.” Id.  See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) 
(holding that child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment).  The Court found that 
child pornography “bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its 
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to 
consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”  Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 19. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 501-561, 110 Stat. 52, 133-
143 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1996)) (repealed 1997).  See Steven D. Hinckley, 
Your Money or Your Speech: The Children’s Internet Protection Act and the Congressional Assault 
on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1025, 1032-39 (2002) and Marc C. 
Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case of Internet 
Pornography, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 977, 983-89 (2002) for a detailed discussion of the CDA 
and related litigation. 
 20. Id.  The “indecent transmission” provision criminalized the knowing transmission of 
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.  See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B).  
The “patently offensive display” provision, criminalized the knowing sending or displaying of 
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.  See 47 
U.S.C. § 223(d).  The prohibition specifically extended to “any comment, request, suggestion, 
proposal, image or other communication” that, in context, depicted or described obscenity or child 
pornography. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1).  The penalty for conviction under the statute is a fine under 
Title 18, or imprisonment for not more than two years.  47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(2003). 
 21. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  Plaintiffs 
sued Janet Reno in her capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America.  Id. 
 22. Id.  The ACLU, Plaintiffs included the American Library Association, as well as dozens 
of Internet service providers, online publishers, and other interested parties.  For a complete list of 
plaintiffs, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997). 
 23. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827.  The plaintiffs filed suit on the day that the Act was signed, 
focusing their challenge on two provisions of the CDA: the “indecency” clause in §223(a)(1) and 
the “patently offensive” clause in §223(d)(1).  Id. at 828.  Plaintiffs contended that the provisions 
were unconstitutionally vague, “infringing upon rights protected by the First Amendment and Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 827. 
 24. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883. 
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the United States Supreme Court.25  In an almost unanimous opinion,26 
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the panel, finding numerous 
constitutional defects.27 
In response, Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA).28  COPA imposed civil and/or criminal sanctions on 
commercial web publishers who knowingly make “material harmful to 
minors” available to children under seventeen.29  In an effort to correct 
the constitutional infirmities of the CDA, Congress narrowed the 
 
 25. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1998).  Special expedited review provisions were included in the CDA 
which provided that if any provision of the Act would be held unconstitutional by a three-judge 
panel in federal court, the matter shall be reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court: 
Expedited review. Act Feb. 8, 1996, P.L. 104-104, Title V, Subtitle C, § 561, 110 Stat. 
142, provides:  
(a) Three-judge district court hearing. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
civil action challenging the constitutionality, on its face, of this title or any amendment 
made by this title, or any provision thereof [for full classification, consult USCS Tables 
volumes], shall be heard by a district court of 3 judges convened pursuant to the 
provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.  
(b) Appellate review. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or 
final judgment, decree, or order of the court of 3 judges in an action under subsection (a) 
holding this title or an amendment made by this title, or any provision thereof [for full 
classification, consult USCS Tables volumes], unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a 
matter of right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Any such appeal shall be filed not 
more than 20 days after entry of such judgment, decree, or order. 
Id. 
 26. Reno, 521 U.S. at 886.  Justice O’Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. 
 27. Id. at 885.  The U.S. Supreme Court found that the CDA was constitutionally 
impermissible because it “is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be 
properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”  Id. at 868.  Further, the 
vagueness of the CDA “raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling 
effect on free speech” particularly because it is a criminal statute, which “may well cause speakers 
to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”  Id. at 
871-72.  Calling the breadth of the CDA “wholly unprecedented,” the Court deemed that “the CDA 
is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all,” and struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional. Id. at 877, 879.  The vagueness doctrine requires that a criminal statute state 
explicitly and definitely what acts are prohibited, so as to provide fair warning and preclude 
arbitrary enforcement. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1584 (7th ed. 1999). 
 28. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 231 (1999)).  See Hinckley, supra note 19, at 1039-45 and Alexander, supra note 19, at 
989-93 for a detailed analysis of COPA and related litigation. 
 29. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000).  COPA prohibits any person from “knowingly and with 
knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the world 
wide web, making any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and 
that includes any material that is harmful to minors.”  Id.  A civil penalty of up to $50,000 may be 
imposed for each violation of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 231(a).  Criminal penalties consist of up to six 
months imprisonment and/or a maximum fine of $50,000.  Id.  An additional $50,000 fine may be 
imposed for any intentional violation of the statute.  Id. 
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statute’s application and more explicitly defined its terms.30  A month 
before the statute was to take effect, a group of plaintiffs31 filed suit in 
federal court alleging that the COPA was constitutionally deficient.32  
The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction barring the 
government from enforcing COPA.33  The government appealed the 
decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.34  
 
 30. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).  While CDA applied to the Internet as a whole, including, for 
example, e-mail messages, COPA applies only to the “World Wide Web.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(1).  
Unlike CDA, COPA does not apply to private parties, but instead targets only those “engaged in the 
business of making such communications.”  47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A). Third, while CDA prohibited 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications, COPA restricts only speech that is “harmful 
to minors” and defined it as material which meets each part of the following test: 
A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking 
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
B) depicts, describes or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to 
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal 
or perverted sex act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; 
and 
C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for 
minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6). 
 31. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).  The ACLU was again joined by a 
variety of online content providers, Website operators, and other interested online commercial 
entities.  Id. 
 32. Id. at 478-79.  Plaintiffs argued that the statute was invalid under the First and Fifth 
Amendments because it impermissibly burdened protected speech, the “harmful to minors” 
definition was unconstitutionally vague, and the statute was not the least restrictive means that the 
government could use to achieve its purpose of protecting minors.  Id.  The “least restrictive means” 
test requires that a law, even when based on a legitimate governmental interest, should be crafted in 
a way that will protect individual civil liberties as much as possible, and should only be as 
restrictive as necessary to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 901 (7th ed. 1999). 
 33. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. at 477.  The district court based its injunction on the principle that 
content-based regulations of constitutionally protected speech are presumptively invalid and subject 
to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 493.  Under strict scrutiny, the government may regulate protected speech 
content to achieve a compelling government interest, if it chooses the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest.  Id.  Because it was not apparent to the court that the government could show 
that the statute met that standard, it issued the injunction.  Id. at 497. 
 34. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) cert. granted sub nom.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
532 U.S. 1037 (2001), and vacated by 535 U.S. 564, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).  The name of the case 
was changed as a result of John Ashcroft being appointed to Attorney General.  The Court of 
Appeals, pointedly distinguishing its analysis from that of the District Court, found COPA 
constitutionally lacking based entirely on “the overbreadth of COPA's definition of ‘harmful to 
minors’ applying a ‘contemporary community standards’ clause.”  Id. at 173-74.  The court noted 
that this issue was virtually ignored by the parties, although it was raised by the court itself at oral 
argument.  Id.  The court’s concern was the adoption of a “community standard” in the context of 
the Internet “because no technology currently exists by which Web publishers may avoid liability,” 
and, therefore, “such publishers would necessarily be compelled to abide by the standards of the 
community most likely to be offended by the message.”  Id. at 177.  The court concluded that 
5
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The government then appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled 
narrowly and remanded.35 
Congress’s third attempt at regulating online speech resulted in the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA).36  CIPA, unlike CDA37 and 
COPA,38 does not regulate speakers (private or commercial website 
publishers), but instead through Internet filtering, limits the receipt of 
information by listeners (patrons of the public libraries).39  In addition, 
CIPA attaches no criminal or civil penalty, but rather requires a public 
library receiving federal funding to install internet filters.40  Because it is 
tied to the government’s spending power,41 CIPA’s proponents maintain 
that it can withstand constitutional scrutiny.42  However, CIPA presents 
 
applying the standard in this way violated the rights of adults by restricting their access to 
constitutionally protected speech.  Id. 
 35. The Court granted certiorari to decide only the limited question presented -- whether “the 
use of ‘community standards’ to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ violates the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 566.  The Court expressed no view regarding other analysis based on  
vagueness or strict scrutiny, specifically holding “only that COPA's reliance on community 
standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ does not by itself render the statute 
substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 585 (emphasis in original). 
The Court, deeply divided over proper legal analysis, wrote five separate opinions, with eight 
justices voting to remand.  Notably, Justices O’Connor and Breyer, in their separate concurrences, 
advocated a “national standard” in evaluating obscenity.  Id. at 586-91. 
 36. Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000) (codified at 20 USC § 9134 (2001) (amending LSTA) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2001) 
(amending E-rate). 
 37. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. 
 38. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
 39. S. REP. NO. 105-226, at 2 (1998) (noting the distinction between CIPA and previous 
legislation designed for protecting children from harmful material on the Internet).  “Filtering or 
blocking what comes out of the Internet is an alternative method of protecting children from 
harmful material.  Filtering or blocking systems restrict what the user may receive over the Internet, 
rather than what a speaker may put on to the Internet.”  Id. 
 40. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h); 20 U.S.C. § 9134.  See S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 7 (1999) (opining that 
“[a] school or library by accepting Federal dollars through the Universal Service fund, becomes a 
partner with the federal government in pursuing this compelling interest [in protecting children from 
sexually explicit material].)” 
 41. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  “The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect 
taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.”  Id. 
 42. Hinckley, supra note 19, at 1053 (stating that advocates of on-line censorship believed 
they found a constitutional approach to Internet regulation in ‘Congress’ power of the purse’).  One 
of the relevant Senate reports stated that the proposed bill attempts “to balance the right of States to 
administer their schools and libraries with the power of Congress to see that federal funds are 
appropriately used” and continues that “[t]he committee has good reason to believe that the filtering 
or blocking conditions set on the receipt of universal service assistance . . . are constitutional.”  S. 
REP. NO. 105-226, at 3 (1998).  But see Alexander, supra note 19, at 993-1002 (asserting that 
legislators reacted to Internet pornography in enacting CDA, COPA, and CIPA for political reasons, 
creating ‘symbolic legislation’ that they knew was unconstitutional and would be struck down by 
the Court). 
6
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another unique set of constitutional problems related to the established 
doctrines regarding forum analysis,43 spending power limits,44 and 
unconstitutional conditions.45 
 
 43. The Supreme Court has identified three different types of fora for purposes of identifying 
the level of First Amendment scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions on speech on 
government property: traditional public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora.  Am. 
Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454 (E.D. Penn. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 
(2003).  Traditional public fora are those places which “by long tradition or by government fiat have 
been devoted to assembly and debate” and include “streets and parks.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  “In these quintessential public forums . . . for the state 
to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  Id.  Designated public 
fora “consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activity.”  Id.  As long as the government retains the open character of the facility, “it is 
bound by the same standards as apply in traditional public forum.”  Id.  Nonpublic fora consists of 
the remaining public property. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d. at 455.  In nonpublic fora, a 
regulation on speech is permitted as long as it “is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”  Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.  See, 
e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (deciding that establishment of 
a municipal auditorium and city leased theatre designed for and dedicated to expressive activities 
created a public forum); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 
167 (1976) (holding that a forum for citizen involvement was created by a state statute providing for 
open board meetings); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (establishing that a state university 
that had an express policy of making its meeting facilities available to registered student groups had 
created a public forum for their use).  But see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, 
473 U.S. 788 (1985) (holding that the federal workplace is a nonpublic fora); Perry, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983) (deciding that a school district’s internal mail system was not a public forum); Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (determining that an airport terminal is a 
nonpublic fora). See also Daniel E. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public 
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 
(1984) (opining that use of public forum analysis confuses First Amendment principles and offering 
alternative methods of evaluation). 
 44. The Constitution’s Spending Clause provides Congress with largely unfettered discretion 
to define how public funds can best be used to promote the general welfare.  Hinckley, supra note 
19, at 1059. Over the last seventy years, Congress received a virtual carte blanche to control the 
activities of federal fund recipients.  Id.  The Supreme Court’s seminal decision regarding 
Congress’s conditional spending is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the withholding of federal highway funds from any 
state with a drinking age below 21).  In its analysis, the Dole Court established four general 
constitutional limits on Congress’s exercise of the spending power.  First, the exercise of the 
spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare.  Id. at 207.  Second, any conditions set on 
the states’ receipt of funds must be sufficiently clear to enable the recipient “to exercise their choice 
knowingly.”  Id.  Third, the conditions on the receipt of federal funds must bear some relation to the 
purpose of the federal funding program.  Id.  Finally, “other constitutional provisions may provide 
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds”  Id. at 208.  Most particularly, the 
spending power may not be used to induce the states to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.  Id. at 210. 
 45. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the government may not condition 
the receipt of its benefits upon the non-assertion of constitutional rights even if receipt of such 
benefits is in all other respects a “mere privilege” and theoretically allows individuals to challenge 
government action which indirectly inhibits or penalizes the exercise of constitutional rights.  
7
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B.  Filter or Lose Funding – CIPA Forces the Choice for Libraries 
Congress continued to be disturbed by the availability of 
pornography on the Internet46 and became aware of a growing problem 
of patrons accidentally or intentionally accessing pornography on the 
Internet in public libraries.47  To assist libraries in providing Internet 
access, the government offers two forms of federal subsidies, commonly 
referred to as “E-rate”48 and “LSTA.”49  Consequently, Congress became 
 
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-8, at 510 (2d ed. 1978); see, e.g., 
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that although a person has no right to a valuable 
governmental benefit, that benefit may not be denied to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests, especially his interest in freedom of speech); Legal Serv. Corp. 
v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (declaring unconstitutional a federal statute restricting the ability 
of legal services providers who receive federal funds to engage in activity protected by the First 
Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to federal regulations 
prohibiting federally funded health care clinics from providing information regarding the use of 
abortion as a family planning alternative).  See also David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional 
Conditions: Chartering Spheres of Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
675 (1992) (offering a new “framework” for evaluating the constitutionality of Congress’s attempts 
to attach conditions upon the receipt of federal funds). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 105-226 at 1 (1998).  The report states that “pornography and other material 
harmful to minors is widespread on the Internet” and notes the danger of “sexual predators using the 
Internet to entice and traumatize their victims.”  Id.  S. REP. NO. 106-141 (1999) discusses at length 
the problems of intentional and accidental access to sexually explicit material on the Internet, the 
harm to children of exposure, and increasing incidents related to on-line pedophiles.  Id. at 2-5. 
 47. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (E.D. Penn. 2002), rev’d, 
539 U.S. 194 (2003).  According to the district court, the volume of pornography on the Internet is 
huge and public library patrons of all ages, including minors, regularly search for online 
pornography.  Id. In addition, some patrons expose others to pornographic images by leaving them 
displayed on the terminals or at printers.  Id. at 423.  For a balanced analysis of the scope of the 
problem, see Laughlin, supra note 6, at 235-41 (giving both statistics supporting the theory that the 
problem is widespread and other statistics indicating that filtering is a “solution in search of a 
problem” and opining that such variance is a product of motives in conducting the studies). 
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1996).  E-rate discounts are subsidies given under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and serve the purpose of extending Internet access to schools and 
libraries in low-income communities.  Id.  According to a 1999 Senate report, E-rate is a $2.25 
million annual subsidy aimed at connecting schools and libraries to the Internet.  S. REP. 106-141 at 
2.  At the conclusion of the first program year of the E-rate, the Schools and Libraries Corporation, 
responsible for administration of the E-rate subsidy program, had processed 30,120 applications and 
funded 25,785.  Id. 
 49. 20 U.S.C § 9134 (2000).  LSTA is a grant given under the Library Service and 
Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9141, awarded in order to: 1) assist libraries in accessing information 
through electronic networks, and 2) to provide targeted library and information services to persons 
having difficulty using a library and to underserved and rural communities, including children from 
families with incomes below the poverty line.  Id.  It is the purpose of LSTA to stimulate excellence 
and promote access to learning and information resources in all types of libraries for persons of all 
ages.  S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 132 (1996).  Put simply, LSTA provides grants for acquiring 
computers or telecommunications technology in low-income neighborhoods.  See also John W. 
Borkowski, Alexander E. Dreier & Maya R. Kobersy, The 2002-2003 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court and its Impact on Public Schools, 181 ED. LAW REP. 1, 16 (2003) (explaining the 
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concerned that E-rate and LSTA programs were facilitating access to 
illegal and harmful pornography and explored ways in which to prevent 
such use.50 
Through hearings and reports, the legislature determined that 
filtering software could block access to pornographic websites, 
providing a reasonably effective way to prevent illegal or harmful uses 
of Internet access at the library.51  In early 1998, Senator John McCain 
introduced a bill that eventually became CIPA.52  While Congress 
considered CIPA, a federal district court struck down a library’s use of 
filtering software as unconstitutional in Mainstream Loudon v. Board of 
Trustees of Loudon County Library.53  The provisions of CIPA, 
 
Court’s holding in CIPA). 
 50. S. REP. NO. 105-226, at 5 (1998).  Also, Marvin Johnson, Legislative Counsel for the 
ACLU testified: 
In October 1998, Congress appointed the Child On-Line Protection Act Commission, or 
COPA Commission, and charged it with identifying technological or other methods that 
would help reduce access by minors to materials that is harmful to minors on the 
Internet. In October of 2000, the Commission reported that blocking technology raises 
First Amendment Concerns because of its potential to be over-inclusive in blocking 
content, concerns are increased because the extent of blocking is often unclear and not 
disclosed, and may not be based on parental choices. The Commission specifically did 
not recommend any mandatory blocking technologies. 
E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children’s Internet Protection Act: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 
(2001) (testimony of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative counsel for ACLU) available at 
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house. 
 51. S. REP. NO. 105-226 at 20-26. 
 52. S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998).  The purpose of the proposed bill, entitled “A Bill to direct 
the Federal Communications Commission to study systems for filtering or blocking matter on the 
Internet, to require the installation of such a system on computers in schools and libraries with 
Internet access, and for other purposes” had the proposed purpose to “protect American children 
from exposure to harmful material while accessing the Internet from a school or library.”  S. REP. 
NO. 105-226 at 1 (1998).  Limiting the scope of the bill, the report stated that “S. 1619 seeks to 
protect children from harmful material in a way that is least intrusive on the self-governance of 
schools and libraries, and on the rights of adults to engage in constitutionally protected speech.”  Id. 
at 3.  The report concludes that S. 1619 does not prevent adults from engaging in constitutionally 
protected material in public libraries because the bill requires “only one computer with Internet 
access in a library to employ a filtering or blocking system.”  Id. at 5.  A later bill, 106 S. 97, 
reflected changes and developments in 105 S. 1619.  S. 97 was defined as “a bill to require the 
installation and use by schools and libraries of a technology for filtering or blocking material on the 
internet on computers with internet access to be eligible to receive or retain universal service 
assistance.” S. REP. 106-141, at 1 (1999).  The purpose of S. 97 was to “protect America’s children 
from exposure to obscene material, child pornography, or other material deemed inappropriate for 
minors while accessing the Internet from a school or library receiving Federal Universal Service 
assistance for provisions of Internet access, Internet service or Internet connection.”  Id. 
 53. Mainstream Loudon v. Bd. of Tr. of Loudon County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. 
Va. 1998) (holding that because the library is a limited public forum, strict scrutiny is applicable 
and the filtering policy at issue was not narrowly tailored, but acted as a prior restraint on speech). 
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however, as originally proposed, appeared to correct the infirmities 
assessed by the district court.54  CIPA was finally enacted into law as 
part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001.55  In its final form, 
CIPA allows a library to receive E-rate or LSTA assistance only if it 
installs a “technology protection measure”56 that protects against access 
through computers to visual depictions that are obscene, child 
pornography, or, for minors, harmful to minors.57  The purpose of the 
 
 54. S. REP. NO. 106-141 at 6.  The senate report distinguishes S. 97 from the Mainstream 
Loudon situation by noting “distinct differences”: 
A major distinction is that this bill is an incentive subsidy and not a police power statute 
that is binding on the public.  Another critical distinction is that filters were used on all 
computers in the Loudon case (both computers used by adults and by children), whereas 
under S. 97 blocking or filtering is required only while a computer is in use by a minor.  
Further, under S. 97, content which is specifically required to be blocked, child 
pornography and obscene material, enjoys no protection under the First Amendment.  On 
the other hand, in the Loudon case, the libraries were required to block material that was 
‘harmful to minors,’ speech that is not traditionally considered to lie outside of First 
Amendment protection. 
Id. 
 55. Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2001, 20 USC § 9134 (2001) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) 
(2001). As implemented, CIPA amended portions of the Museum and Library Services Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 9134 (regarding LSTA subsidies) and portions of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 
U.S.C. § 254(h) (regarding E-rate).  See Hinckley, supra note 19, at 1054 (stating that the bill 
languished in Congress for two years until it was finally included as an eleventh-hour rider to the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001).  Hon. Gene Green, a House Representative from Texas 
opined that: 
last year’s decision by our colleague in the Senate to include this legislation in the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 was ill-timed and unwise. This legislation was 
enacted without any significant hearings or public input and has now placed our schools 
and public libraries in a delicate legal position. Once again Congress, in its rush to 
protect children from online smut, has over regulated the issue. 
E-rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children’s Internet Protection Act, Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the  Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 
(2001) (comments of Rep. Gene Green) available at www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house.  In its 
final form, CIPA incorporates the infirmities noted by the Loudon court and Congress – filtering is 
required on all computers and material harmful to minors is included in the blocking.  See CIPA, 20 
USC § 9134 (2001) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2001). 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I).  CIPA defines a “technology protection measure” as a “specific 
technology that blocks or filters Internet access to material covered by” the Act.  Id. 
 57. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)-(C); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A).  For minors, the technology 
protection measure must protect against visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography or 
harmful to minors.  47 U.S.C. §254(h)(6)(B)(i)-(ii) (regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C. §9134(f)(1)(A)(i)-
(ii) (regarding LSTA).  With respect to adults, the technology protection measure must protect 
against visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography.  47 U.S.C. §254(h)(C)(i)-(ii) 
(regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C. §9134(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (regarding LSTA).  CIPA defines a “minor” as 
“any individual who has not attained the age of 17 years.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(D).  Under CIPA, 
“obscene” has the meaning given in 18 U.S.C. § 1460, and “child pornography” has the meaning 
given in 18 U.S.C. § 2256.  47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(E) & (F).  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2256: 
‘[C]hild pornography’ means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, 
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
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legislation is to protect children from being exposed to harmful materials 
at a school or library.58  To receive any federal funding through LSTA or 
E-rate,59 the technology protection measure must be installed on all 
computers in the library with Internet access.60  CIPA also provides that 
the Internet filter may be disabled to enable access for bona fide research 
or other lawful purposes.61 
 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, 
where— 
  (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; 
  (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated 
image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; or 
  (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
18 USCS § 2256 (8) (2004).  Further, CIPA defines material that is harmful to minors as: 
[A]ny picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that (i) taken as a 
whole and with respect to minors, appeals to the prurient interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion; (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect 
to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual 
or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as to 
minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G)(regarding E-rate). 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7) (regarding LSTA). 
 58. See S. Rep. 106-141 (1999).  The stated purpose of the Act is “to protect America’s 
children from the harm of exposure to obscene material, child pornography or other material 
deemed inappropriate for minors.”  Id. at 1. 
 59. With regard to E-rate, “Any library that fails to comply with the application guidelines 
regarding the annual submission of certification required by this paragraph shall not be eligible for 
services at discount rates. . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(i).  In addition, “Any library that 
knowingly fails to ensure the use of its computers in accordance with a certification under 
subsection (B) and (C) shall reimburse for all funds and discounts received under this subsection for 
the period covered by such certification.”  47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(ii).  With regard to LSTA, 
“Whenever the Director of the Institute of Museum and Library Services has reason to believe that 
any recipient of funds under this chapter is failing to comply substantially with the requirements of 
this subsection, the Director may withhold further payments to the recipient under this subchapter.”  
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(5)(A). 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i)-(C)(i) (regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)-(B) 
(regarding LSTA).  A library may not receive discount rates (through E-rate) or funding (under 
LSTA) unless the library certifies that it “is enforcing a policy of internet safety which includes the 
operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with internet 
access. . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (regarding LSTA).  
Under CIPA’s revisions to the E-rate program, disabling is permitted only during adult use.  47 
U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D).  However, the LSTA provisions permit disabling for both adults and minors.  
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3). 
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C.  The Limitations of Internet Filtering 
In a library setting, a filter is typically run on a server computer 
which connects all of the computers in a library and intervenes between 
users and the Internet.62  Filters operate by restricting access to the 
Internet on either a “white list” or a “black list” basis.63  “Black list” 
filters, the type most commonly used in libraries, block access based on 
a pre-screening of unacceptable sites, screening for pre-selected 
keywords and/or based on a rating (similar to PG or R moving ratings) 
given to a site by its producer.64  Current filtering technology, however, 
has serious limitations resulting in over-blocking of constitutionally 
protected sites and under-blocking of restricted sites.65  Several factors 
account for Internet filters’ inaccuracy, most significantly the sheer size 
 
 62. Richard J. Peltz, Use “The Filter You Were Born With”: The Unconstitutionality of 
Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries,” 77 WASH. L. REV. 397, 
401 (2002) (setting forth the history of computer filtering in libraries, describing the filtering 
process, and explaining limitations of filtering technology). 
 63. Id. at 402.  “Black list filters,” also called “blocking filters,” presume that the user is 
entitled to full access to the Internet, but revoke access when the user seeks content that matches the 
filter’s blocking criteria, otherwise termed the “black list.”  “White list filters,” conversely, only 
grant access to parts of the Internet that are selected as appropriate.  Id.  Some libraries use white-
list filters for areas such as a children’s section, but for the most part, the type of filtering at issue in 
library use is the black list variety.  Id. at 403. 
 64. Id. at 404-08.  This article will not fully discuss the distinctions and technology of each 
type of filtering.  For the purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient to understand the general ways in 
which filtering operates. A 1999 Senate report described the situation most clearly: “There are two 
basic categories of such technology, blocking and filtering . . . . Blocking software prevents access 
to Websites or E-mail addresses preprogrammed into the software . . . . Filtering software screens 
sites based on keywords and rating systems.”  S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 6.  See Am. Library Ass’n v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416-20 (E.D. Penn. 2002) (giving a detailed analysis of filtering 
technology), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  See generally Peltz, supra note 62, at 401-07 (giving a 
detailed technical description of filtering technology). 
 65. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11.  According to evidence presented by 
experts, the court found that “commercially available filtering programs erroneously block a huge 
amount of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 448.  The court noted that the 
expert witness for the government found that between 6 percent and 15 percent of the blocked sites 
in public libraries did not contain restricted content.  Id.  This over-blocking results in “at least tens 
of thousands of pages” being blocked even though “no rational person could conclude [the content] 
matches the category definitions of pornography or sex.”  Id. at 449.  For an enlightening look at 
sites erroneously blocked, see examples given by the district court at 446-47.  One author noted that 
filters screen by looking for consecutive letters and cited an instance in which a website on ‘Mars 
exploration’ was blocked because it contains the consecutive letters “s,” “e,” and “x”.  Adam 
Horowitz, The Constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
425, 434 (2000).  Although the government acknowledges that tens of thousands of sites may be 
erroneously blocked, it points out that because there are approximately two billion pages of material 
on the Internet, the rate of blocking is only one-two-hundredths of one percent even if 100,000 
pages are blocked.  United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, United States v. Am. Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (oral argument before the Supreme Court by Theodore 
Olson, Solicitor General, on behalf of Appellant United States) available at 2003 WL 1089390. 
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of the Internet66 and its rate of change.67  In addition to the problems of 
over-blocking and under-blocking, filters cannot evaluate images; thus, a 
website containing no words but only objectionable images would 
escape detection.68  This is significant because CIPA specifically 
attempts to limit “visual depictions,” but does not mention limitations on 
text.69 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts and Procedural History 
Anticipating the potential infringement on First Amendment rights, 
various libraries, library associations, library patrons, web-site 
publishers, and the ACLU filed complaints against the United States 
government prior to CIPA’s April 2001 implementation date, 
challenging the Act’s constitutionality.70  The suits were consolidated, 
 
 66. Peltz, supra note 62, at 414.  The Court in Am. Library Ass’n noted that as many as two 
billion Websites are estimated to exist in the indexable Web.  Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 
445.  Before a three-judge panel, Dr. Jeffrey Nunberg testified that by one estimate, a million and a 
half sites per day are added to the World Wide Web.  Certified Record on Appeal at 134, United 
States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Nunberg before the 
district court) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/2mer/2002-
0361.mer.ja.vol.1.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “Nunberg testimony”). 
 67. Horowitz, supra note 65, at 432.  For example, a website may contain obscene material on 
the day it is reviewed, but it may subsequently be removed; thus, maintaining a legally accurate 
database requires frequent re-evaluation of websites because of the constantly changing nature of 
the Internet.  Id.  Dr. Nunberg estimates that the average website has a half-life of about 90 days, 
meaning that most sites “just don’t last that long.”  Nunberg testimony at 146. 
 68. Peltz, supra note 62, at 406.  See also Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 431 
(discussing the inability of filters to screen visual depictions).  For an explanation of how image 
filtering works, see Nunberg testimony at 173-174. 
 69. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A) (permitting libraries LSTA funding upon a certification that a 
technology protection measure is in place “that protects against access through such computers to 
visual depictions. . . .”); 47 U.S.C. §254(h)6)(B)(permitting libraries to receive E-rate discounts 
based upon a certification that a technology protection measure is in place “that protects against 
access through such computers to visual depictions”). 
 70. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 
F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Penn. 2002); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Multnomah 
County Pub. Library v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Penn. 2002).  For a complete 
listing of Plaintiffs, see Am. Library Assoc. v. United States, 201 F.Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Penn. 2002), 
rev’d 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  Plaintiffs alleged that CIPA was unconstitutional on its face because: 1) 
it induces public libraries to violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights in violation of the 
Spending Clause; and 2) it requires libraries to relinquish their First Amendment rights as a 
condition on the receipt of federal funds and is therefore impermissible under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.  Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 407.  United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n also contends that CIPA requires libraries to impose content-based restrictions on 
patrons’ access to constitutionally protected speech.  Id.  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n further 
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with American Library Association (ALA) going forth as lead plaintiff.71  
The basis of the ALA suit rests in the undisputed fact that CIPA blocks 
access to constitutionally protected speech, which they asserted violates 
a library’s right to provide patrons with information and violates a 
patron’s right to receive information.72  The Government responded that 
CIPA does not compel libraries to violate the First Amendment because 
the use of filtering programs is similar to a selection of a library’s 
collection which has traditionally been left to a library’s discretion.73  
Additionally, the Government relied on previous Supreme Court rulings 
establishing that Congress may restrict the use of subsidies to the 
purposes for which they were intended and is not obligated to fund 
protected speech.74 
Pursuant to the provisions of CIPA, a three-judge court convened to 
try the issues.75  After an eight day trial, the district court held CIPA 
facially unconstitutional based on violations of the First Amendment76 
and the Spending Clause.77  The court enjoined the government from 
 
states that these content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the public forum 
doctrine and are therefore only permissible only if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
state interest and no less restrictive alternative would further that interest.  Id. 
 71. Am. Library Ass’n., 201 F. Supp. at 401. 
 72. Id. at 408.  See also supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing filtering 
limitations) and infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the right to receive 
information). 
 73. Id. at 407.  The Government submitted that CIPA is facially invalid only if it is impossible 
for any public library to comply with its conditions without violating the First Amendment.  Id.  The 
government promoted the view that the decision to install filters is equivalent to a library’s 
decisions in choosing its print collection.  Id. at 408.  Those collection decisions by a library are 
subject only to rational basis review, as opposed to strict scrutiny; thus, because filters are fairly 
effective, the library made a reasonable choice.  Id.  Additionally, the Government asserted that 
public libraries do not create a public forum, since public libraries may reserve the right to exclude 
certain speakers from availing themselves of the forum; thus, the restrictions on Internet access are 
subject only to rational basis review.  Id. at 409. 
 74. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that “a refusal to fund protected activity 
cannot be equated with an imposition of a penalty on that activity”). 
 75. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appendix D 1741, 114 
Stat. 2763A-351-52 (2000).  The statute requires any constitutional challenge to be heard “by a 
district court of three judges.”  Id. at 1741(a). 
 76. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411.  The district court found that in providing the 
Internet, public libraries create a public forum open to any speaker to communicate with library 
patrons; as such, it is subject to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 409.  Because Internet filtering overblocks a 
substantial amount of protected speech, the suppression of which serves no legitimate government 
interest, it is not narrowly tailored.  Id. at 410. 
 77. Id. at 409.  The court held that because a public library complying with CIPA will 
necessarily restrict patrons’ access to a substantial amount of protected speech, compliance with 
CIPA results in violation of patrons’ First Amendment rights.  Id.  Therefore, in promulgating 
CIPA, Congress exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause.  Id. (citing South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (finding that Congress is permitted to attach conditions on the receipt of 
14
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withholding federal assistance for non-compliance with CIPA.78  The 
court’s opinion discussed several less restrictive means, including 
installation of recessed monitors, enforcement of Internet use policies 
and parental monitoring of minors.79  The district court went on to state 
that because CIPA failed under both First Amendment forum analysis 
and Congress’s spending power, it was not necessary to examine 
arguments related to the unconstitutional conditions, prior restraint of 
speech, or vagueness theories.80  Finally, the court held that the 
unblocking provisions of CIPA did not cure its constitutional 
deficiencies.81  Pursuant to the provisions of CIPA, the government filed 
for direct review by the United States Supreme Court.82 
 
federal funds, but is prohibited from using its spending power to induce the recipient to engage in 
activities that would violate the Constitution)).  In its analysis, the court stated that whether CIPA 
violated Congress’ power under the Spending Clause would turn on the level of scrutiny applicable 
to a public library’s content-based restrictions on Internet access, which would in turn depend on 
public forum analysis.  Id.  The court determined that a public library is a limited public forum, and 
because CIPA’s filtering requirements impermissibly constitute a content-based restriction on 
access to a public forum, the statute was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Id.  Further, although 
the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from obscenity, the use of software 
filters is not narrowly tailored to further that interest.  Id. at 410. 
 78. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411. 
 79. Id. at 410. 
 80. Id. at 411.  The district court, while not ruling upon the unconstitutional conditions claim, 
did discuss the application of the doctrine.  Id. at 492-94.  See supra note 45 (explaining the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine).  Under this theory, even if no  First Amendment violation 
results from a public library using filtering software,  a First Amendment violation occurs when the 
federal government requires public libraries to use filters as a condition of the receipt of federal 
funds.  Am. Library Ass’n 201 F. Supp. 2d at 490.  Two situations presented a possible 
constitutional violation based on CIPA’s conditional spending: the restriction of the library from 
providing constitutionally protected material to the public, and, separately, a library patron’s right to 
access the constitutionally protected speech.  Id. 
 81. Id. at 411.  The court noted that although the evidence reflects that libraries can and do 
unblock materials upon patron request, the requirement that a patron must request the unblocking 
will deter many patrons because they are embarrassed or desire to protect their privacy or remain 
anonymous.  Id.  Moreover, the unblocking may take days and may be entirely unavailable.  Id. 
 82. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 reads in pertinent part: 
Appellate review.  Notwithstanding any other portion of law, an interlocutory or final 
judgment, decree, or order of the court of three judges. . . holding this title or an 
amendment made by this title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be 
reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-129 (2001). 
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B.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
1.  Plurality Opinion 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,83 reversed the ruling of 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.84  The opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, held that because public 
libraries’ use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ 
First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the 
Constitution, and is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power.85  In 
reaching its decision, the Court analyzed CIPA’s provisions against 
previous holdings related to the Spending Clause doctrine,86 public 
forum doctrine,87 and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.88 
According to the plurality, to determine whether Congress 
exceeded its power under the Spending Clause in enacting CIPA, the 
pertinent analysis is whether the condition that Congress requires would 
 
 83. A plurality opinion lacks enough judges’ votes to constitute a majority, but receives more 
votes than any other opinion.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (7th ed. 1999).  According to 
“Marks rule,” when the Supreme Court issues a fractured, plurality opinion, the opinion of the 
Justices concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds – that is, the legal standard with 
which a majority of the Court would agree – is considered the Court’s holding. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 986 (7th ed. 1999).  If a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less 
than a majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis 
effect.  20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 159 (1984).  See also Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981) (noting a trend in the increase in Supreme Court 
plurality opinions and that such decisions are “useless as guides to lower courts, to the Supreme 
Court in resolving future cases, and to legislatures trying to cope with incomprehensible 
pronouncements of the court”). 
 84. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 85. Id. at 214 (reversing the holding of the district court). 
 86. Am. Library Ass’n 539 U.S. at 202-09.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 
(establishing the Spending Clause limitation that Congress is permitted to attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds, but is prohibited from using its spending power to induce the recipient to 
engage in activities that would violate the Constitution).  See also supra note 44 (discussing the 
conditional spending doctrine). 
 87. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205-09. The Court describes traditional public fora as 
those that have been “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”  Id. at 205-06.  See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 
473 U.S. 788 (1985).  See also supra note 43 (discussing public forum doctrine). 
 88. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 209-213.  See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) 
(establishing that the government may not “deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests – especially, his interest in freedom of speech,” even if he has no 
entitlement to that benefit; to do so would impose an unconstitutional condition on receipt of the 
benefit). See supra note 45 (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). 
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be unconstitutional if performed by the library itself.89  To begin the 
analysis of whether it would be unconstitutional for a library to install 
filters, the Court first examined the role of libraries in society.90  The 
plurality described the traditional mission of a library as one of 
facilitating learning and cultural enrichment, and noted that in order to 
fulfill its mission, a library must have broad discretion to make content-
based judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to 
the public.91  The Court rejected forum analysis in the context of this 
case,92 holding that Internet access is neither a traditional nor a 
designated public forum.93  The Court further distinguished the purpose 
of library Internet access, which is not to provide a public forum for 
website publishers to express themselves, but rather is offered to 
facilitate learning.94  Therefore, the plurality concluded that because 
Internet access in a library is not a public forum and libraries typically 
 
 89. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 203, n.2 (asserting that Justice Stevens misapprehends the 
analysis necessary under Spending Clause precedent when he “asks and answers whether it is 
unconstitutional for Congress to impose [CIPA’s filtering] requirement” on public libraries). 
 90. Id. at 203-04.  To determine if a library could choose to install filters on its own, the 
plurality analogized the blocking of material as a ‘collection decision,’ traditionally left to the 
librarian’s discretion.  Id. at 203-09.  Thus, if blocking material on the Internet is seen as analogous 
to deciding not to add a book to the bookshelf, the library has the discretion to install filters without 
implicating public forum analysis and strict scrutiny.  Id. 
 91. Id. at 203, n.2.  A library’s goal has never been to provide universal coverage, but rather 
to provide materials that would be of greatest benefit or interest to the community.  Id. at 204.  A 
public library staff must necessarily consider content in making collection decisions and enjoy 
broad discretion in making them.  Id. at 205.  But see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (1982) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the public library as a place for “freewheeling inquiry”).  See 
also Laughlin, supra note 6, at 219-26 (discussing at length public libraries’ historical mission and 
history of censorship). 
 92. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205-06.  The Court, referring to prior holdings in Ark. Ed. 
Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 532 U.S. 666 (1988), and Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 
524 U.S. 569 (1998), stated: 
Just as forum analysis and heightened public scrutiny are incompatible with the role of 
public television stations and the role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the 
discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional missions. . . . The 
public forum principles on which the District Court relied are out of place in the context 
of this case.  Internet access in a public library is neither a traditional nor a designated 
public forum. 
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 204. 
 93. Id. at 205.  In evaluating the public forum argument, the Court found that Internet access 
in a library is not a traditional public forum because such status does not extend beyond the historic 
confines of places such as parks and streets.  Id. at 205-06. Neither is library Internet access a 
designated public forum, because “in order to create such a forum, government must make the 
affirmative choice to open its property for use as a public forum; it isn’t created by inaction.”  Id. at 
206.  The plurality concluded that the government made no such choice.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 206-07.  The opinion quotes Congress as stating that the Internet is simply another 
method for making information available in a school or library—“it is no more than a ‘technological 
extension of a book stack.’”  Id. at 207. 
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make content-based judgments in selecting materials, a library’s 
decision to use filtering software must be viewed as a collection 
decision, not a restraint on private speech.95  Any concerns over filtering 
software’s tendency to “over-block” constitutionally protected speech 
are remedied by the ability of patrons to request that the filter be 
disabled.96 
The Court next rejected ALA’s “unconstitutional condition” 
claim.97  The plurality concluded that, assuming public libraries had 
constitutional rights, ALA’s claim fails on the merits because the 
government is entitled to broadly define a program for which it has 
appropriated public funds and has the right to insist that public funds be 
spent for the purposes for which they were intended.98  In granting funds 
through LSTA and E-rate, the government’s mission was to make the 
Internet available in libraries for education.99  Because using filtering 
software helps to carry out the library’s mission of obtaining appropriate 
material for educational and informational purposes, the plurality 
concluded that it is a permissible condition.100 
 
 95. Id. at 208.  The Court also stated that the fact that a library reviews and affirmatively 
chooses to acquire every book in its collection is not a constitutionally relevant distinction.  Id.  
Because of the vast amount of quickly changing material on the Internet, for the library to do so in 
this context would be impossible; therefore, the use of filtering software is a reasonable alternative.  
Id. 
 96. Id. at 208-09.  Although the district court viewed unblocking as an inadequate remedy 
because of reluctance or embarrassment, the Supreme Court replied that “the Constitution doesn’t 
guarantee acquiring information at a public library without embarrassment.”  Id. at 209. 
 97. Id. at 210-11.  See Perry v. Sinderman, supra note 45.  Am. Library Ass’n alleged that 
CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on libraries that receive federal subsidies by requiring 
them as a condition upon receipt to surrender a First Amendment right to provide the public with 
access to constitutionally protected speech.  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 209.  The government 
countered that government entities do not have First Amendment rights.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (2003)).  In Rust, the Court held 
that a statute allocating funds for family planning, but forbidding its use for abortion counseling, did 
not deny a benefit to anyone, but instead mandated that funds were spent on purposes for which 
they were authorized.  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. 
 99. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1) (regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C § 9121, et seq. (regarding LSTA).  
The plurality quotes the intended purposes of the programs: “It is the purpose of LSTA to stimulate 
excellence and promote access to learning and information resources in all types of libraries for 
individuals of all ages” and “[t]he E-rate program ‘will help open new worlds of knowledge, 
learning and education to all Americans . . . .’”  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212 n.5. 
 100. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210-12.  CIPA does not penalize libraries that choose not 
to install filtering software, or deny them the right to provide their patrons with unfiltered Internet 
access at their own expense.  Id.  Rather, CIPA simply reflects Congress’ decision not to subsidize 
doing so.  Id. at 212. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (holding that “a refusal to fund protected activity, 
without more, cannot be equated with an imposition of a penalty on that activity”).  See also 
Hinckley, supra note 19, at 1072-80 (discussing the implications of Rust at length and examining 
post-Rust funding of private speech). 
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2.  Concurring Opinions 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer each wrote an opinion concurring in 
the judgment.101  Justice Kennedy focused his concurrence on the fact 
that, on request of an adult user, a librarian can disable the Internet 
blocking software without significant delay.102  Because of this 
provision, he contended, an adult library user’s access is not 
significantly burdened, saving CIPA from being facially 
unconstitutional.103  By contrast, Justice Breyer agreed with the plurality 
that forum analysis is inapplicable.104  He also agreed that CIPA is 
constitutional, but would reach it through applying a “heightened 
scrutiny” analysis.105  In his analysis, the small burden that the Act 
places on the library patron seeking protected speech is not 
disproportionate when considered against the government’s legitimate 
interests in protecting children, and is therefore constitutional.106 
 
 101. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 214-20. 
 102. Id. at 214 (citing the district court opinion at 485-86, which states that “the disabling 
provisions permit public libraries to allow a patron access to any speech that is constitutionally 
protected with respect to that patron”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Kennedy 
also relied on the testimony of Theodore Olson that the library must disable the filter upon a 
patron’s request.  United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, United States v. Am. Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (oral argument before the Supreme Court by Theodore 
Olson, Solicitor General, on behalf of Appellant United States), available at 2003 WL 1089390. 
 103. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215.  However, if libraries do not have the ability to 
unblock the filter, the statute may be subject to an “as-applied challenge.”  Id.  A “facial challenge” 
is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face – that is, it always operates unconstitutionally.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (7th ed. 1999).  In contrast, an “as-applied challenge” reflects the 
idea that although the law appears constitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional as applied based 
on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party.  Id. 
 104. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105. Id. at 216-17.  Justice Breyer asserted that in this context, where competing constitutional 
interests are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is potentially justified by unusually strong 
governmental interests, the key question is one of proper fit.  Id. at 218.  In such cases, the Court has 
asked whether the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate in light of both the 
justifications and alternatives.  Id.  “Heightened scrutiny” is also described as “intermediate 
scrutiny” and is defined as ‘a standard lying between the extremes of rational-basis review and strict 
scrutiny; under the standard, if a statute contains a quasi-suspect classification, the classification 
must be substantially related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 820 (7th ed. 1999).  The most stringent form of judicial scrutiny, “strict 
scrutiny,” is applied to potential infringement upon fundamental rights and requires the state to 
establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates the law in question.  Id. at 
1435.  By contrast, the most lenient test is “rational basis,” which requires only that a law bear a 
reasonable relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective.  Id. at 1269. 
 106. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 219-20.  The Act (CIPA) seeks to restrict access to 
obscenity, child pornography, and, in respect to access by minors, material that is comparably 
harmful; these objectives are legitimate and often compelling.  Id. at 218.  Although present 
technology both under-blocks and over-blocks that access, no one has come up with a better fitting 
alternative.  Id. at 219.  Finally, Justice Breyer noted that the Act allows an adult access to a 
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3.  Dissenting Opinions 
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented, judging CIPA 
unconstitutional on its face.107  Justice Stevens focused his dissent on the 
over-blocking and under-blocking deficiencies inherent in current 
internet filtering software.108  After describing the over-blocking as “an 
overly broad restriction on adult access to protected speech,” he opined 
that the government interest cannot justify such a restriction.109  In 
addition, he noted that a variety of less restrictive alternatives are 
available.110  Finally, in his opinion, the ability of an adult patron to 
disable the software does not cure the Act’s infirmities.111  Justice Souter 
also authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined, 
reasoning that CIPA is invalid under Congress’s spending power 
because CIPA forces action that would violate the First Amendment if 
libraries took that action entirely on their own.112  Finally, Justices 
 
wrongly blocked site, and opined that “it is difficult to see how that burden could prove more 
onerous than traditional library practices of segregating materials or waiting for interlibrary loan.”  
Id. 
 107. Id. at 220-43. 
 108. Id. at 220-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But see Peltz, supra note 62, at 410-417 (reviewing 
Internet filters, their capabilities and limitations, and concluding that the over-blocking problem is 
not as pervasive as commonly believed). 
 109. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 222. “The government may not suppress lawful speech as 
the means to suppress unlawful speech.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 
234, 255 (2002) (holding that speech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced 
completely in an attempt to shield children from it)). 
 110. Id. at 223-24.  Alternatives listed include enforcement of Internet use policies, parental 
monitoring of minors, installation of privacy screens and/or recessed monitors, and placement of 
unfiltered monitors out of sight-lines.  Id. 
 111. Id. at 224.  In discussing that the statute creates a prior restraint on speech, Justice Stevens 
stated that “a law that prohibits reading without official consent, like a law that prohibits speaking 
without consent, ‘constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional 
tradition.’”  Id. at 225 (quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150, 166, (2002) (holding that in evaluating a statute’s impingement on First Amendment 
rights, the Court must examine the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether there is 
an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests the statute 
purports to serve)). 
 112. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 231-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).  A library that chose to 
block an adult’s Internet access to “material harmful to children” would be imposing a content-
based restriction on communication of material that an adult could otherwise see—this would 
simply be censorship.  Id. at 234-35. “The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of 
information and opinion. . .”  Id. at 235 (quoting Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) 
(discussing that the policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion 
and is designed to prevent any action of the government which might prevent such free and general 
discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential)). In his discussion of censoring, Justice 
Souter also stated, “. . .[W]e should recognize the right of a library’s adult Internet users, who may 
be among the 10 percent of American Internet users whose access comes solely through library 
terminals. There should therefore be no question that censorship by blocking produces real injury. 
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Souter and Ginsburg opined that the Act cannot be saved by its 
unblocking provisions because such is subject to the discretion and 
approval of library staff.113 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. American Library 
Association is based upon analysis of well-established constitutional 
law, but as applied to a new medium – the Internet.114  The difficulty in 
application is self-evident from the fact that the Court entered such a 
badly splintered opinion.115  This portion of the Note will analyze the 
Court’s approach to the constitutional issues it addressed, identify issues 
the Court ignored, and discuss the future effect of both the opinion itself 
and its implementation. 
A.  Internet Access in a Library Should Properly Be Considered a 
Designated Public Forum 
In holding that forum analysis was not applicable to Internet access 
in a library, the Court relied heavily on two lines of reasoning: its 
characterization of the “traditional” role of a library116 and two prior 
 
. . .”  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 242 n.8. 
 113. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 232-34. The unblocking provision cannot be construed to 
say that a library must unblock upon adult request, but instead that unblocking may be permitted 
only for “bona fide research or other lawful purposes.” Id. at 233 (citing CIPA, 20 U.S.C § 
9134(f)(3)). 
 114. “Just as the development of new media presents unique problems, which inform our 
assessment of the interests at stake, and which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in 
other contexts, the development of new media such as the Internet, also presents unique possibilities 
for promoting First Amendment values.”  Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 
470 (E.D. Penn. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (discussing a developing area of law 
based on the intersection of cyberspace and free speech).  Lessig notes that many believe that 
cyberspace simply cannot be regulated – that its anonymity and multi-jurisdictionality makes 
control by the government impossible.  Id. at 505.  He asserts, however, that behavior in cyberspace 
can be regulated and we as a society must choose whether the values embedded there will be values 
we want. Id. at 548.  See also Alexander, supra note 19 (reviewing the various attempts at 
regulating Internet pornography and observing that “while the law develops slowly, the Internet has 
exploded rapidly, and comparisons to prior legal precedent thus prove unhelpful”); Eileen Candida, 
Comment, The Information Superhighway – Caution – Roadblocks Ahead: Is the Use of Filtering 
Technology to Prevent Access to “Harmful” Internet Sites Constitutional?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 85 (1999) (discussing the history of Internet related legislation and asserting that 
traditional application of First Amendment analysis will not work in an Internet context). 
 115. See supra notes 75-113 and accompanying text discussing the plurality, concurring and 
dissenting opinions by the Justices. 
 116. U.S. v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 202-04 (2003).  The plurality noted that while 
“public libraries pursue the worthy mission of facilitating learning and cultural enrichment,” to 
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cases involving federal funding in which the Court had determined 
forum analysis to be inapplicable.117  In so framing the library’s mission, 
however, the Court came to a conclusion inconsistent with prior 
holdings,118 library history,119 and the ALA’s own modern view of its 
mission.120  The plurality’s analysis that the facts sub judice were 
analogous to Forbes and Finley is centered on its premise of a library’s 
mission; thus, valid conflicting views of a library’s mission seriously 
undermine that analogy.121  If a library’s mission is “to provide 
 
fulfill their traditional missions they must “have broad discretion to decide what material to provide 
to their patrons.”  Id. at 203-04.  The plurality states that the goal “has never been to provide 
universal coverage” but only to provide materials of “requisite and appropriate quality.”  Id. at 204. 
 117. Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) (holding that public 
forum principles do not generally apply to a public television station’s editorial judgments regarding 
the private speech it presents to its viewers); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 
(1998) (finding that public forum analysis does not apply in the context of arts funding programs 
using content-based criteria in making funding decisions). 
 118. See Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing a 
public library as a place “of freewheeling inquiry”); Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420 
(concluding that although public libraries operate in a wide variety of communities they share a 
common mission: “to provide patrons with a wide range of information and ideas”); Kreimer v. 
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1256 (1992) (describing a public library as the “quintessential 
locus for the right to receive information and ideas” and holding that a public library was a limited 
public forum). 
 119. See EVELYN GELLER, FORBIDDEN BOOKS IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES 1876-1939: A STUDY IN 
CULTURAL CHANGE (1984).  Although the first libraries were partisian, even propagandistic in 
nature, as early as 1731 the role of the library began expanding to include education, and, thus, the 
support of democratic ideals.  Id. at 3-4.  Benjamin Franklin praised “social libraries for having . . . 
made the common tradesman and farmer as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries, and 
perhaps contributed to the stand so generally made throughout the colonies in defense of their 
privileges.”  Id.  Libraries were censored through a “neutrality” policy, so that those of “differing 
creeds” could meet together in peace.  Id. at 8-9.  As a result of Andrew Carnegie’s philanthropy, 
public libraries greatly expanded from 1899 to 1917 and censorship issues followed.  Id. at 54.  
Even as these debates brewed, librarians were urged to guarantee that “‘all people had access to all 
ideas.’”  Id. at 156.  As early as 1914, librarians already saw themselves as part of a community 
engaged in the cooperative pursuit of knowledge and the “free trade” of ideas.  Id.  In response to 
increased pressure to censor during World War I, librarians for the first time began resorting to the 
First Amendment to protect library collections.  Id.  At the 1934 conference of the American 
Library Association, Lyman Bryson urged librarians on professional grounds to exercise this clear 
public duty as part of their “responsibility as custodians of the public mind” and called libraries the 
“invention of modern democracy” which librarians had a duty to defend.  Id.  See also Laughlin, 
supra note 6, at 219-27 (reviewing the history of censorship in United States public libraries). 
 120. The American Library Association’s “Library Bill of Rights” provides that “all libraries 
are forums for information and ideas” and that “libraries should challenge censorship in the 
fulfillment of their responsibility to provide information and enlightenment.”  American Library 
Association Library Bill of Rights, available at www.ala.org/work/freedom/lbr.html (last visited on 
Jan. 19, 2004).  See Laughlin, supra note 6, at 227 (stating that as early as 1939, the American 
Library Association adopted the Library’s Bill of Rights, which criticized the “growing intolerance, 
suppression of free speech, and censorship affecting the rights of minorities and individuals”). 
 121. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 204-05.  After describing the library’s need to have broad 
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information and ideas,” if it is a “freewheeling place of inquiry,” and if, 
as the ALA proffers, “censorship should be challenged,” then the need 
for “broad discretion” in making “content-based decisions” is not central 
to achieving its mission, but rather a by-product of limited funding and 
shelf space; therefore the analogy fails.122 
Although the plurality states that forum analysis does not apply in 
this particular context, it then goes on to analyze and specifically reject 
the proposition that Internet access in the public library is a limited 
public forum.123  In doing so, however, the plurality misframes the 
 
discretion to further its mission, the plurality described “two analogous contexts” in which the Court 
held that “the government has broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what 
private speech to make available to the public.” In pursuing its analogy, the plurality framed the 
situation in Forbes as one in which forum principles did not apply because of “the discretion that 
stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory 
obligation.”  Id. at 204 (quoting Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673).  With regard to Finley, the plurality stated 
it declined to apply forum analysis because “any content-based considerations that may be taken 
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding” and 
because it would conflict with “NEA’s mandate . . . to make esthetic judgments, and the inherently 
content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA support.”  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205 
(quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 585, 586).  The plurality concluded that just as forum analysis and 
heightened scrutiny are incompatible in the Forbes and Finley cases, “they are also incompatible 
with the discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional missions.”  Id.  But see 
Laughlin, supra note 6, at 247 (“The [Loudon] court noted that unlike hard copy resources, 
restricting access to Internet publications neither saved money nor space.  In fact, filtering increased 
library costs.”). 
 122. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 235-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also, Robert C. 
Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
4 (2003) (opining that the U. S. Supreme Court decides cases as much on cultural judgments as on 
constitutional analysis).  Post observes that the Court’s debate over whether a library would violate 
the First Amendment by installing filters: 
[D]oes not turn on the text of the First Amendment, or on the intentions of the 
Framers . . .  or even on the interpretation of legal materials. Instead, it turns on how the 
cultural practice of librarianship is to be understood, and also how the new technology of 
library filters should be regarded.  Rehnquist and Souter seem to agree that if libraries 
are institutions that routinely exercise content-based discretion in deciding what material 
to make available to their patrons, CIPA does not violate the First Amendment.  But if 
libraries follow a norm of providing material to patrons without exercising such 
discretion, at least in circumstances that are relevantly analogous to the installation of 
Internet filters, there is a strong argument that CIPA is unconstitutional.  Resolving the 
constitutional inquiry depends upon how the Court characterizes the social meaning of 
libraries and Internet filters. 
Id. at 79-80. 
 123. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 204-06.  Public forum analysis was limited to the library’s 
provision of Internet access, rather than to the library as a whole, because the Court has held that the 
“relevant forum is defined not by the physical limits of the government property at issue, but rather 
by the specific access that the plaintiff seeks.”  Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
401, 455 (E.D. Penn. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def . & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (holding that where groups were seeking participation in the 
Combined Federal Campaign charity drive, the relevant forum was not the entire federal workplace, 
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argument by focusing on the Internet speakers’ right to speak,124 and 
ignoring the library patron’s right to receive information.125  The 
Supreme Court has, in a variety of contexts, referred to a First 
Amendment right to receive information and ideas.126  Because a listener 
 
but the charity drive itself); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n. 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 
(defining the relevant forum as the school’s mail system, not the public school as a whole, in 
deciding a union’s right to accessing teachers mailboxes). 
 124. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206-07. In distinguishing the facts from Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court stated a library provides Internet 
access “not to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,” not in order to “create a public 
forum for web publishers to express themselves,” but for the same reasons it offers other library 
resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of 
requisite and appropriate quality.”  Id. at 207.  But see Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-680 (observing that 
the government creates a designated public forum when it makes its property generally available to 
a certain class of speakers, but does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than 
reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must 
then, as individuals, “obtain permission”). 
 125. Brief of Appellees American Library Association at 19, n.17, United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (“This case fundamentally involves the right of 
library patrons to receive information on the Internet. The First Amendment undoubtedly 
encompasses not only the right to speak but also the right to receive information.”); Am. Library 
Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 456 (“The right at issue in this case is the specific right of library patrons 
to access information on the Internet, and the specific right of Web publishers to provide library 
patrons with information via the Internet.”).  See also Laughlin, supra note 6 at 245 (“[I]f First 
Amendment protection applied only to the speaker and not to the recipient, it is doubtful that 
filtering would face any constitutional problems.  Filtering does not prevent Web publishers from 
speaking, but only blocks the access of potential recipients.”).  Among all the varying opinions by 
the justices in the American Library Association decision, however, only Justice Breyer 
acknowledged a constitutional right to receive information; further, he concluded that the Act 
directly restricted that right.  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215-16 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 126. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (observing that the right of 
freedom of speech includes the peripheral right to receive information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that it is well established that the Constitution protects the right to 
receive information and ideas); Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857-68 (1982) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that “[t]he right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the senders First Amendment right 
to send them); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (recognizing that the right to receive 
information applies to the Internet).  See generally, Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to 
Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974) (stating that although the right to receive 
information could be viewed as dependent on the exercise of another’s right of speech, the Court 
has recognized it in situations in which the source of information has no right of expression).  See 
also TRIBE, supra note 45, §§ 12-19, at 675-76: 
A right to know at times means nothing more than a mirror of a right to speak, a 
listener’s right that government not interfere with a willing speaker’s liberty.  But the 
right to know at times means more: it may include an individual’s right to acquire 
desired information or ideas free of . . . undue hindrance.  Such undue hindrance may 
entail deliberate interference with the acquisition of specified information; more 
commonly, it entails government action that is largely indifferent to individual 
information gathering but that nonetheless operates as a deterrent to its uninhibited 
pursuit.  Such a right to know may entail no correlative right in any particular source to 
originate the communication. 
Id. 
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has a right to receive information, and “a public forum can be created by 
government designation of a place or channel of communication for use 
by the public at large for assembly and speech,”127 Internet access in a 
library may reasonably be considered a limited public forum for the 
purposes of receiving information.128 
If Internet access in a library is characterized as a limited public 
forum, any content-based restriction on speech (and its receipt) is subject 
to strict scrutiny.129  Internet filtering as required by CIPA fails strict 
scrutiny: although it has as its root a compelling governmental 
 
 127. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. 
 128. See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (holding that the purpose of a library in 
general and the provision of the Internet within the public library in particular, is for use “by the 
public for expressive activity, namely the dissemination and receipt by the public of a wide range of 
information” and therefore “when the government provides Internet access in a public library, it has 
created a designated public forum”); see also Mainstream Loudon v. Bd. of Tr. of Loudon County 
Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that the government intended to designate 
the local libraries as public fora for the limited purposes of the expressive activities they provide, 
including the receipt and communication of information through the Internet).  According to 
Cornelius, public forum analysis would include looking at the nature of the property involved, the 
manner in which the government has made the forum generally available, and whether the property 
is consistent with expressive activities.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03.  In the facts at hand, the 
nature of the property involved – the Internet - was described in Reno, 521 U.S. at  853, as a “vast 
library including millions of readily available publications” with expression “as diverse as human 
thought.”  The government (in this case the library) made the forum available by “open[ing] its 
doors to the public at large.”  See American Library Association Library Bill of Rights, supra note 
120 (stating that the purpose of a library is to provide free access to the public).  The property, 
whether viewed as the Internet or the library itself, is opened for the receipt of information.  Id.  
Thus, based on the Cornelius test, Internet access in a public library would be deemed a limited 
public forum.  See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d. at 456-57; Mainstream Loudon, 24 F. Supp. 
2d at 563; Brief of Appellees American Library Association at 20, United States v. American 
Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361).  But see Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering 
and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public Libraries’ Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 
FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 217-227 (arguing that the Court should identify libraries as a “new type of 
forum,” rejecting conventional public forum analysis altogether in the library setting).  Bell opines 
that “unlike designated public fora, where the government can set the substantive bounds of the 
debate, public libraries should be open to all intellectual inquiries.  Because libraries are the 
archetypal fora for listeners, library patrons should have access to any speech protected by the First 
Amendment . . . such a presumption is consistent with the history of public libraries in this country.”  
Id. at 226. 
 129. See, e.g., Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (observing that 
designated public fora are created by purposeful governmental action).  If the government excludes 
a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum is made generally available, 
its action is subject to strict scrutiny.  Id.  To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction on speech must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Governmental interest; if a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.  United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (holding that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does 
not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny). 
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interest,130 it is neither narrowly tailored131 nor the least restrictive means 
available.132  Even if filters did not over-block material, CIPA could not 
pass strict scrutiny because the filters restrict access to information on all 
computers to that which is acceptable for a child.133  As a result of over-
blocking and suppression of material adults are entitled to receive, CIPA 
fails constitutional muster by impermissibly restricting protected speech 
in a limited public forum. 
 
 130. See Reno, 521 U.S. 844,869-70 (1997) (holding that government has a compelling interest 
in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors which extends to shielding them 
from indecent messages that are not obscene by adult standards. . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (stating that it is evident beyond the 
need for elaboration a state’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor is compelling). 
 131. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 475-80.  Given the thousands of over-blocked 
pages and the lack of ability to tailor blocking to the legal definitions of obscenity or pornography, 
Internet filtering cannot succeed as being “narrowly tailored.”  Id. 
 132. See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480-84 (listing several alternatives to filtering, 
such as Internet use policies, recessed monitors, or a simple tap on the shoulder). See also S. REP. 
NO. 106-141 (1999) (requiring filtering or blocking technology to be turned on only while a 
computer is in use by a minor and allowing local communities to decide the nature and extent of 
filtering).  Prior to CIPA’s implementation Congress had considered an alternative bill, the 
Neighborhood Children’s Internet Protection Act (NCIPA), geared specifically toward children and 
clearly less restrictive than CIPA. Neighborhood Children’s Internet Protection Act, H.R. 4577, 
Amend. No. 3635, 106th Congress, 146 Cong. Rec. § 5823-07, Sec. 5842 (June 27, 2000).  NCIPA 
in its original form would have given libraries two ways to qualify for library Internet subsidies: 
either implement a comprehensive plan to prevent children from accessing harmful material on the 
Internet, or purchase the filtering technology now required by CIPA.  146 Cong. Rec. § 5843. 
Libraries choosing the former method would have had full discretion to develop their own standards 
regarding what is appropriate for children; federal agencies could not review the decisions.  Id.  
Although Congress eventually passed a version of NCIPA, 47 U.S.C. 254 (1), libraries receiving E-
rate discounts must comply with both CIPA and NCIPA – they cannot chose between the Acts. See 
Brief of Appellees American Library Association at 4, nn.5&6, United States v. American Library 
Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133. See also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (stating that the 
Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to suppress unlawful speech); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (stating that the government’s interest in protecting children “does 
not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. . . . [T]he Government 
may not ‘reduce the adult population to only what is fit for children.’”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Although CIPA mandates different standards for adults and children 
(only children are restricted from accessing “material harmful to children”), because of the way 
filtering works in a library - from one main terminal - all computers will have the same level of 
filtering. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)-(C);20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A).  See also supra notes 62-69 and 
accompanying text, describing filtering technology.  The American Library Association noted in 
their brief that “although both history and the name of the Act focus on children, the restrictions are 
clearly applicable to adults. The Senate report dismissed the acknowledged First Amendment 
concerns over filtering by focusing on the fact that the bill, at the time, required filtering ‘only while 
the computer is in use by a minor.’”  Brief of Appellees American Library Association at 3, United 
States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (citing S. REP. NO. 106-141 at 1, 7). 
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B.  CIPA’s Conditional Subsidy Exceeds Congress’s Spending Power 
The plurality opined that the core of Spending Clause analysis rests 
in whether the condition imposed would be unconstitutional if the 
libraries imposed it unilaterally; if so, CIPA would violate the 
“independent constitutional bar” prong of the Dole test.134  Therefore, 
because CIPA is unconstitutional based on the forum analysis 
undertaken in part A above, CIPA also fails the Dole test of compliance 
with the Spending Clause. Congress’s conditional spending under CIPA 
could fail of its own volition, however, based on a separate analysis 
under the Dole holding.135  In addition to the four-part test set out above, 
the Dole court acknowledged a further limit established by its previous 
holdings: a financial inducement offered by Congress cannot be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which “pressure turns into 
compulsion.”136  Thus, if a library has no realistic choice except “filtered 
access” or “no access,” Congress has exceeded its spending authority.137  
 
 134. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 203-04. The Court considered the fourth prong of the Dole 
test, establishing that “Congress may not induce the recipient [of federal funds] to engage in 
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”  Id.  Thus, the Court opined that if the First 
Amendment permits a library to install filters itself, Congress’s conditional spending would be 
upheld.  Id. 
 135. See supra note 44 (setting out the four part test relevant to Congress’s conditional 
spending).  See also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687 (1999) (acknowledging that the “intuitive difference between” a “denial of a gift or 
gratuity” and a “sanction” disappears when the gift that is threatened to be withheld is substantial 
enough). 
 136. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that a condition on five percent 
of the federal funds otherwise obtainable did not amount to coercion, but an incentive).  Compare 
Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th  Cir. 1997) (en banc) (striking down a statute based 
on ambiguity, but stating in dicta that the withholding of the entirety of a state’s sixty million dollar 
federal education grant due to a failure to meet a condition affecting 126 students is “considerably 
more pernicious than the relatively mild encouragement at issue in Dole” and “begins to resemble 
impermissible coercion if not forbidden regulation in the guise of a Spending Clause condition”). 
 137. See  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.  But see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off 
the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine and How a Too-Clever Congress 
Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 466-67 (2002) (stating that during the last fifteen 
years the lower courts have for the most part read the “coercion” provision of the Dole test to be 
“toothless” and for the most part non-justiciable because of the difficulty in drawing a line between 
“financial inducement” and “coercion”).  Baker and Berman further elaborate that “the lower courts 
have consistently failed to find impermissible coercion. . . [and] have increasingly questioned 
whether there is any viability left in the coercion theory.” Id. at 468; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional 
Federal Spending and States Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 104 (offering a 
substitute for the Dole test with one that would “better safeguard state autonomy” and noting that 
since only three members of the Dole majority are still sitting. . . the possibility of change is real”).  
See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that even the loss 
of $130 million in grants is not coercive and observing that the Court has never employed the 
coercion theory to invalidate a funding condition); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 
1989) (observing that the coercion theory has been “much discussed but infrequently applied in 
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Substantial government funds are allocated to finance the Internet in 
libraries.138  A low-income community library receiving 90% of its 
Internet funding from the government most likely cannot provide 
Internet access without the subsidy.139  Whether a subsidy is determined 
to be coercive, however, can depend on whether the Court looks at the 
amount at issue as a fraction of a total state budget, or as a fraction of 
each library’s budget.140  If the relevant budget is the library’s, CIPA 
gives libraries receiving a significant amount of federal technology 
funding the choice between “filtered access” or “no access” in violation 
of the Spending Clause.141 
 
federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party”); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 
401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding no coercion in the state’s threatened loss of its entire Medicaid 
funding, opining that “the courts are not suited to evaluating whether the states are faced here with 
an offer they cannot refuse or merely with a hard choice,”and “follow[ing] the lead of other courts 
that have explicitly declined to enter this thicket when similar funding conditions have been at 
issue”). 
 138. E-rate discounts amounted to $58.5 million in the year ending June 2002 according to the 
Justice Department; LSTA grants totaled more than $149 million in fiscal year 2002.  Charles Lane, 
Ruling Backs Porn Filters in Libraries, WASHINGTON POST, June 24, 2003, at A01. 
 139. E-rate and LSTA were implemented to allow “low-income communities” and “families 
with incomes below the “poverty line” to gain Internet access at libraries and schools.  47 U.S.C. § 
254 (h)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 9121.  Discounts on services for eligible libraries are set as a percentage of 
the pre-discount price, and range from 20 percent to 90 percent, depending on a library’s level of 
economic disadvantage and its location in an urban or rural area.  Am. Library Ass’n v. United 
States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (E.D. Penn. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  Currently, a 
library’s level of economic disadvantage is based on the percentage of students eligible for the 
national school lunch program in the school district in which the library is located.  Id.  For 
example, in the Nioga Library system in New York, the loss of E-rate would result in an increase in 
the cost of phone access lines for Internet hookups from $7,500 to $15,000 – over a 40 percent 
increase.  Charity Vogel, Internet Ruling puts Libraries in the Hot Seat, BUFFALO NEWS, June 24, 
2003, at B1.  Even the loss of a relatively small portion of their budget makes a library think twice 
about refusing the filters because, as one librarian put it “with our funding situation . . . we count 
every penny twice and every dollar three times.”  Id.  Refusing to implement filters would result in a 
loss in the range of a few thousand dollars in small communities to $1 million in the Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin system; critics note that the court’s ruling will hit hardest in communities that can ill-
afford to turn down federal funding.  Scott Williams & Katharine Goodloe, Library Internet filters 
upheld; but Administrators in State Call it Censorship, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, June 24, 
2003, at 01A.  San Francisco libraries, by contrast, get only about $150,000 from the federal 
government annually, out of a $53 million overall budget.  Web Porn Filters Go To High Court: 
Case to Decide Whether Use in Libraries Violates Freedom of Speech, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, March 5, 2003, at A5. 
 140. See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202; Nevada, 884 F.2d at 448 ; Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 414. 
 141. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.  But see S. REP. NO. 105-1619 (opining that because universal 
service assistance only provides a discount, ineligibility to receive that discount does not rise to the 
level of impermissible coercion). 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/6
SANCHEZ1.DOC 3/11/2005  11:38 AM 
2005] UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 491 
C.  CIPA Violates the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
Even if CIPA managed to make it through the above public forum 
and Spending Clause analyses, it violates the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.142  The plurality held that, assuming the library, as a public 
entity, had constitutional rights,143 the claim would fail because CIPA is 
simply a limit on spending and nothing more.144  However, because 
 
 142. See supra note 45 (explaining the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).  The doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is difficult to apply because, “despite wide acknowledgement of the 
doctrine’s importance in modern constitutional law, attempts to explain how it arises or what it does 
have been largely unsuccessful.”  Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1990).  Baker further notes that “the 
Court has yet to arrive, explicitly or implicitly, at a clear limiting principle for deciding challenges 
to conditions on government benefits.”  Id. at 1195.  Important to the analysis is the baseline chosen 
to determine the unconstitutionality of the condition.  Comparing “no benefit” with “benefit with a 
condition” makes the condition virtually always permissible; comparing “benefit without a 
condition” with “benefit with a condition” makes the condition virtually always fail.  Id. at 1192.  
See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1419 
(observing that the doctrine serves a limited but crucial role because it identifies a characteristic 
technique by which government appears not to, but does burden constitutionally preferred liberties, 
triggering a demand for especially strong justification).  In its application, the Court blurs what 
Sullivan sees as three distinct approaches to determining the constitutionality of a conditioned 
benefit: the coercive nature of the condition, the defect in the legislative process which created it, 
and the inalienability of constitutional rights.  Id. at 1419-21. 
 143. Justice Rehnquist did not definitively state whether a library, as a public entity, had First 
Amendment rights because that issue remains unanswered.  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 
539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003).  In asserting that government entities do not have constitutional rights, 
the government relied on a concurrence in Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 
412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (opining that [t]he First Amendment protects the press from governmental 
interference; it confers no analogous right on the government).  However, based on its analysis, the 
district court opined in dicta that “the notion that public libraries may assert First Amendment rights 
for the purpose of making an unconstitutional conditions claim is clearly plausible, and may well be 
correct.”  Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
 144. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212.  The Court stated that the claim would fail on its 
merits because “[w]ithin broad limits, when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a 
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”  Id. The plurality continued that the 
government is not “denying a benefit to anyone but instead simply insisting that public funds be 
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The 
Court thus analogized the situation to that in Rust, in which the government funded speech in a 
family planning clinic, but prohibited discussion of abortion as part of the federally-funded 
program.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  However, the Court in that case clearly defined 
the parameters of an unconstitutional condition, stating that a condition is unconstitutional where 
“the government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy, rather than on a particular 
program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in protected conduct 
outside the scope of the federally funded program.”  Id. at 174.  The Rust Court held in essence that 
where the government seeks to leverage its grant-making power by imposing restrictions beyond the 
grant’s scope, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is triggered; as long as the government limits 
its restriction to activities engaged in with the aid of the governmental grant, it has not imposed an 
unconstitutional condition.  David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of 
Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992). 
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CIPA conditions funding on installing filters on every single 
computer,145 even those wholly funded with state and local dollars, the 
Act reaches beyond its funding limits.146  In addition, although the 
government partially funds the installation of filters through LSTA 
subsidies, CIPA requires local libraries to pay the balance, further 
burdening local funds.147  The plurality states that CIPA “does not 
penalize libraries that choose not to install software . . . [t]o the extent 
that libraries choose to offer unfiltered access, they are free to do so 
without federal assistance.”148  The plurality fails to mention that, 
 
 145. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A), (B) and 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(B), (C).  Under CIPA, a public 
library receiving E-rate or LSTA funding must certify that blocking software operates on “any of its 
computers with Internet access” during “any use of such computers.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Solicitor General Theodore Olson, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, acknowledged that a 
library receiving federal money could not designate one of 10 computer terminals in a branch as an 
unsubsidized unfiltered computer; a library system that wanted to offer unimpeded access could, 
however, establish a separate operation that would not accept federal money.  Linda Greenhouse, 
The Supreme Court: Internet Filters. Sides Debate Web Access in Libraries, N. Y. TIMES, March 6, 
2003, at A1. 
 146. In his dissent, Justice Stevens, noting that CIPA’s reach, asserted that “respondents are 
not merely challenging a ‘refusal to fund protected activity, without more . . . they are challenging a 
restriction that applies to property that they acquired without federal assistance.’”  Am. Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 231 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding tax exempt status for organizations that did not use tax 
deductible contributions for lobbying activity).  In upholding the deduction, the Court noted that a 
single organization may have a non-lobbying section eligible for deductible contributions and 
simultaneously operate a lobbying affiliate which would not be able to receive tax deductible 
contributions.  Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.  See also Fed. Comm. Comm’n. v. League of Women 
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down a condition that public television stations 
receiving federal funds not editorialize with any of their funds, whether federal or not).  In its 
analysis, the Court held that while Congress could require stations to segregate their funds and use 
only non-federal funds for activities Congress did not wish to subsidize; it could not withdraw all 
public funding from a station that engaged in editorializing.  Id. at 400.  In its brief, ALA asserts 
that “as in League of Women Voters, this [restriction even on non-federally funded computers] 
creates an unconstitutional funding scheme because a recipient that receives only 1% of its overall 
funding from federal grants is barred absolutely from all provision of unfiltered Internet access.” 
Brief of Appellees American Library Association at 43, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 
U.S. 194 (2003) (No. 02-361) (internal quotations omitted). 
 147. S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 11.  Under the needs-based matrix, universal service assistance 
will provide up to a 90 percent discount on the purchase price of these filtering systems.  Id.  The 
remainder will be incurred by the schools and libraries, and the cost per computer is likely to be 
relatively small.  Id. (emphasis added).  Library officials for the Buffalo & Erie County Public 
Library stated that in 2000 they were given an estimate by SurfControl for filtering software: the 
software alone cost $10,000, annual updates were estimated at $2,600 per year, and a new server 
and switch necessary to run the filtering system was estimated at $10,000; the officials noted that 
this estimate did not include related costs for installation, support, and staff training.  Charity Vogel, 
Filtering the Web: Now that the Supreme Court Has Spoken, the Buffalo & Erie County Public 
Library Must Wrestle with the Task of Blocking Children’s Access to Internet Pornography, 
BUFFALO NEWS, June 30, 2003, at B1. 
 148. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212.  The plurality goes on to say that “the legislature’s 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/6
SANCHEZ1.DOC 3/11/2005  11:38 AM 
2005] UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 493 
contrary to the spirit of its previous holdings in Rust, Regan and League 
of Women Voters, the library is not free to provide unfiltered access even 
on computers purchased with state and local dollars as long as the library 
is taking one penny of federal funds.149  In addition, Supreme Court 
precedent indicates that the Rust holding applies only in situations where 
government speech is subsidized, not where funding is intended to 
provide access to a variety of private speech.150  Thus, because CIPA 
reaches beyond its funding provisions and its restriction on funding of 
private speech is impermissible, the Act fails the unconstitutional 
conditions standard. 
D.  Infringement Upon the States’ Tenth Amendment Rights 
Congress cannot invade a state’s autonomy and impose regulation 
without a constitutional basis for its power.151  Through its broad 
application of the Spending Clause, Congress circumvents the Tenth 
Amendment’s restriction of federal power.152  If Congressional spending 
 
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.”  Id. 
(quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549).  But see the dissent by Justice Stevens, stating that “an 
abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of benefits can be just as pernicious as an 
abridgement by means of a threatened penalty.”  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 227 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 149. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A), (B) and 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(B), (C). 
 150. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).  When 
the government appropriates funds to promote a particular policy of its own, it is entitled to say 
what it wishes.  Id.  When the government disburses funds to a private entity to convey a 
governmental message, it may take appropriate steps to ensure the message is not garbled or 
distorted.  Id.  But, where the government does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message 
it favors, but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers, 
viewpoint-based restrictions are not proper.  Id.  See also Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 228 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Rust only applies when the government seeks to communicate a 
specific message, but not in this situation where the subsidies are designed to provide access to a 
“vast amount and wide variety of public speech”). 
 151. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.  See, 
e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the take title provision of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985 exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and 
violated the Tenth Amendment).  In New York v. U.S., the Court explained that if a power is 
delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any 
reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.  Id. at 
156.  See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that a provision of the Brady 
Handgun Act which required state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on 
handgun purchasers unconstitutionally required state officers to execute federal law). 
 152. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (holding that the “Tenth Amendment 
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs does not concomitantly limit the range of 
conditions legitimately placed on federal grants,” and also observing that “objectives not thought to 
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power as applied to the states is invalidly exerted, however, the 
legislation also fails Tenth Amendment scrutiny because Congress is 
then regulating the states without constitutionally valid authority for 
doing so.153 
As discussed previously, CIPA violates the Spending Clause 
because installation of filters that block constitutionally protected speech 
infringes upon library patrons’ constitutionally protected right to receive 
information in a limited public forum.154  Thus, CIPA conditions receipt 
of federal funds on a state’s violation of its patrons’ constitutional rights; 
in doing so it violates Dole’s holding that Congress may not condition 
receipt of federal funds on a state’s violation of the Constitution.155  
Additionally, an argument can be made that the coercive nature of CIPA 
invalidates Congress’s use of its spending power in this instance.156  
Because Congress’s authority to enact CIPA through the Spending 
Clause is invalid, and other constitutional authority for such state 
regulation is non-existent, CIPA violates the Tenth Amendment.157 
Furthermore, the conditional spending at issue in CIPA creates a 
collision of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Congress’s 
spending power and the Tenth Amendment.158  Simply put, the 
 
be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields . . . may nevertheless be attained through use of 
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds”).  See also Baker supra note 137 at 
104 (observing that “[p]revailing spending clause doctrine, however, permits Congress to use 
conditional offers of federal funds in order to circumvent any restrictions the Constitution might be 
found to impose on its authority to regulate the states directly”). 
 153. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 137, at 105 (opining that “the states will be at the mercy of 
Congress so long as Congress is free to make conditional offers of funds to the states that, if 
accepted, regulate the states in ways that Congress could not directly mandate”); Sullivan, supra 
note 142, at 1417 (observing that although the Court has held that the federal government may not 
use its spending power to pressure states into yielding constitutionally protected autonomy, the 
Court has nevertheless rejected every federalism-based challenge to conditions on federal subsidies 
since the New Deal). 
 154. See supra note 43 discussing public forum doctrine. 
 155. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (recognizing that other constitutional provisions may provide an 
independent bar to the grant of federal funds, but the Tenth Amendment alone is not a bar). 
 156. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text (discussing impermissible coercion). 
 157. See supra note 151 for a discussion of the Tenth Amendment restriction providing that 
Congress may not exercise powers not enumerated in the Constitution; rather these are reserved to 
the states. 
 158. See Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 484.  The authors state that: 
conditional spending is just another example of this phenomenon (after listing other 
unconstitutional condition situations) for it involves the federal government’s 
conditioning the benefit of federal funds on an offeree state’s waiver of one of its 
sovereign prerogatives. . . . [Yet] Dole proceeds as though the Court’s own resolution of 
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unconstitutional conditions problem arises whenever government 
conditions a benefit on the offeree’s waiver of a constitutional right.159  
CIPA forces any library receiving funding to install filters on all library 
computers – even those purchased with state and local dollars; thus, the 
conditional spending reaches beyond its boundaries in violation of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.160  Rather than simply “restricting 
the use of its funds,” it also restricts the library’s use of state and local 
funds.161  Such overreaching also violates the Tenth Amendment 
because the state must waive its sovereign right to control state and local 
dollars in exchange for receipt of federal funding.162 
The plurality, however, ignored any federalism concerns.163  
Ironically, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the opinion, has 
previously been described as an advocate of states’ rights.164  Justice 
Kennedy (who concurred that CIPA was constitutional based on its 
disabling provisions) has publicly remarked that “conditional federal 
spending . . . is the major states’ rights issue facing the country 
 
 159. Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 484.  See also supra notes 142-150 and 
accompanying text (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in more detail). 
 160. See supra notes 45, 142-150 and accompanying text (discussing unconstitutional 
conditions). 
 161. See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.  Potential threats to state autonomy 
occur when the federal government attempts to increase its own power at the expense of the states.  
Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 951, 955 (2001).  “Such aggrandizement may occur, for example, when the federal 
government takes over regulatory functions traditionally exercised by the states [or] preempts 
sources of state revenue.”  Id. 
 162. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.  In College Savings Bank, the Court held 
constructive waivers of sovereign immunity to be inherently coercive, saying “the point of coercion 
is automatically passed – and the voluntariness of the waiver destroyed – when what is attached to 
the refusal to waive [sovereign immunity] is the exclusion of the state from otherwise lawful 
activity.”  Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999).  But see early cases setting the tone of current 
Spending Clause doctrine, such as Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (deciding 
that the powers of the state are not invaded, since the funding offer imposes no obligations but 
simply extends an option which the state is free to accept or reject); Oklahoma v. United States 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (finding no violation of the State’s sovereignty 
because the state has the choice not to yield to what it calls “federal coercion”). 
 163. See Paul M. Smith & Daniel Mach, Major Shifts in First Amendment Doctrine Narrowly 
Averted, 21 FALL COMM. LAW. 1, 31 (2003).  The plurality showed no awareness of the federalism 
concerns caused by giving the federal government unlimited ability to control local government 
through funding restrictions.  Id.  Through CIPA, Congress attempts to micromanage the internal 
operations of a library (an agency of the local government), imposing a one-size-fits-all Internet use 
policy regardless of any local factors.  Id. 
 164. See Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 460 (generally describing the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism revival advancing a “single core purpose: the reduction of national power . . . and the 
concomitant increase of state power”).  The author describes Chief Justice Rehnquist as one of the 
“States’ Rights Five” along with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.  Id. at  460-61. 
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today.”165  The Court’s decisions allowing Congress’s spending power to 
go virtually unchecked have permitted invalid circumvention of the 
Tenth Amendment’s restrictions on regulating the states.166  Respecting 
states’ autonomy is important not only as a constitutional matter, but 
also for our democratic society’s general need to respect the diversity of 
its citizens.167  A state’s freedom from federal interference, like an 
individual’s freedom from governmental restrictions, is a freedom to 
make choices, not just a freedom to choose wisely.168  The Court, in 
upholding CIPA, imposed its “wisdom” upon the states without any 
valid power to do so. 
 
 165. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 137, at 115.  Additionally, Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas recently observed: 
Under Dole, Congress can use its spending power to pursue objectives outside of Article 
I’s enumerated legislative fields by attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds . . .  
the Spending Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the 
power to obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power 
by permitting the federal government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of state 
concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach. 
Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 510 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 166. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 137.  According to Professor Baker, 
“the greatest threat to state autonomy is, and has long been, Congress’s spending power.”  Id. at 
105.  She notes that Justice O’Connor sounded a similar concern in her dissent in Dole: 
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress’ notion of the general welfare, 
the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the 
Spending Clause gives ‘power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the 
states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no 
restrictions save such as are self-imposed.’ This, of course, was not the Framers’ plan 
and it is not the meaning of the Spending Clause. 
Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 167. See generally Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 471.  In the absence of a nationwide 
consensus, permitting state-by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would the 
imposition of a uniform national policy, and will almost always therefore increase aggregate social 
welfare.  Id.  Because Dole’s interpretation of the spending power is so generous, Congress’s 
authority to drive states toward a single nationwide policy is greatly enhanced, regardless of the 
preferences of citizens in some states to have a different policy.  Id. at 472.  Further, because 
through the spending power Congress need only respond to the preferences of a majority of the 
states, its actions may well be at odds with the preferences of a dissenting minority of states; yet the 
will of the majority is imposed.  Id. at 472, 476.  But see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV.  903, 935 (1994) (opining 
that “the United States is a single, functioning nation, and that it generally defines good policy 
through a national decision-making process”). 
 168. Baker & Berman, supra note 137, at 479.  Federalism, including judicially enforced limits 
on Congress’s power, seeks to create a space within which a political community can make choices 
about how to govern itself without interference from the national government.  Id. at 480. 
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E.  Libraries Cannot Literally Comply with CIPA’s Provisions 
CIPA requires a library to install a technology device to block 
access to “visual depictions” that are “obscene, child pornography or 
harmful to minors.”169  With current technology, libraries cannot 
possibly comply with these requirements because no currently available 
filter is capable of screening for “visual depictions.”170  Therefore, any 
attempt to comply with CIPA will necessarily fail.171  The most 
commonly used Internet filters use word lists to screen for words or 
phrases that suggest a website contains material that is “obscene, child 
pornography or harmful to minors.”172  This situation presents another 
barrier to compliance: under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
concepts such as “obscenity” and “material harmful to children,” even if 
statutorily defined, must be interpreted based on local community 
standards.173  Computer software developers alone create the parameters 
of their filtering lists; libraries and other users have no input into what is 
filtered and do not know what websites are blocked.174  Although a 
 
 169. 47 U.S.C. §254(h)(6)(B)(i)-(ii) (regarding E-rate); 20 U.S.C. §9134(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) 
(regarding LSTA). 
 170. Peltz, supra note 62 at 406.  See also Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
401, 431 (E.D. Penn. 2002) (discussing the inability of filters to screen visual depictions), rev’d, 539 
U.S. 194 (2003). 
 171. Even the U.S. Attorney General admitted that blocking programs inescapably fail to block 
objectionable speech because they are unable to screen for images.  Brief of Appellant United States 
at 40-41, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511). 
 172. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text discussing how Internet filtering works. 
 173. For purposes of federal obscenity prosecutions, the applicable “community” whose 
standards are to be examined are those of any district in which such offense was begun, continued, 
or completed.  MADELINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 215 (2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
3237).  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscenity is to be 
determined by “contemporary community standards,” not “national standards”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002) (stating that the “Court’s community standards” jurisprudence applies to 
the Internet).  In addition, the Ashcroft Court stated that the same “community standard” rule applies 
to statutory definitions of “harmful to minors.”  Id. at 583.  Further, the Court observed that 
“although nowhere mentioned in the relevant statutory text, this Court has held that the Miller test 
defines regulated speech for purposes of federal obscenity statutes. . . .”  Ashcroft, at 786 & n.11.  
See also Laughlin, supra note 6, at 279 (opining that local decision makers should decide if minors’ 
Internet access requires filters; they are the best persons to judge local community standards for 
what is obscene, as required by the Miller test); Horowitz, supra note 65, at 427 (observing that “a 
finding of obscenity is a legal conclusion that can be made by a fact finder only after applying the 
test set forth in Miller,” and the same standard applies to the Internet as to any other vehicle for 
expression); Alexander, supra note 19, at 1006-10 (discussing that obscenity cannot be regulated 
“top-down” because no uniform national standards exist to judge obscenity).  But see William S. 
Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 204 (1995) (asserting that cyberspace erodes the rationale for applying 
local community standards as the definitive touchstone for whether materials are, in fact, obscene). 
 174. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 430.  The district court states that no one but the 
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particular site might be able to be unblocked, a library cannot adjust the 
filter to their local community standard and certainly cannot assume that 
the software developers are guided by statutory definitions rather than 
their own discretion.175  Thus, even libraries using filters cannot literally 
comply with the filtering requirements of CIPA.176 
F.  Future Problems: Legal Precedent & Public Impact 
Because no single opinion spoke for a majority of the Court, the 
analysis in United States v. American Library Association has virtually 
no precedential value.177  Had the plurality gained one more vote, the 
case would have signaled a shift in free speech jurisprudence.178 
 
filtering companies has access to the complete list of URLs in any category.  Id.  The URLs or IP 
addresses of Web pages on the filtering software’s category lists are considered proprietary 
information and are unavailable for review by customers.  Id.  See also testimony of Marvin 
Johnson, attorney for the ACLU: 
The terms “obscenity,’’ ‘‘child pornography’’ and ‘‘harmful to minors’’ as used in CIPA 
are legal terms. None of the current vendors of blocking technology claim to block 
categories that meet these legal definitions, nor do they employ attorneys or judges to 
make those determinations. Leaving decisions of what constitutes obscenity, child 
pornography and material harmful to minors up to legally untrained persons leads to 
more information being blocked than is legally permissible. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecomm. and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (testimony of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative counsel for ACLU), 
available at www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house. 
 175. The district court stated that based on the information presented to the court, no category 
definition used by filtering software companies is identical to CIPA’s definitions of visual 
depictions that are obscene, child pornography or harmful to minors.  Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. 
Supp. 2d at 429.  The court further noted that category definitions and categorization decisions are 
made without reference to local community standards.  Id.  See also Horowitz, supra note 65, at 431 
(opining that it is unlikely that Internet filtering companies have the resources or technology to 
become sufficiently familiar with the community standards applicable in every library that uses their 
product, and it is doubtful that any nationally distributed filtering software would be created with 
any particular community in mind). 
 176. The situation complicates a library’s legal situation because as at least one court observed 
“a defendant cannot avoid its constitutional obligation by contracting out its decision-making to a 
private entity.”  See  Mainstream Loudon v. Bd. of Tr. of Loudon County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 
552, 569 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 177. See supra note 83 (discussing the lack of legally binding effect of plurality opinions); 
Smith & Mach, supra note 163, at 29 (stating that the reasoning of the concurrences virtually 
nullified the precedential value of the plurality opinion); Borkowski, supra note 49, at 17 (observing 
that all of the justices - plurality, concurrence & dissent - seemed to come to some key points of 
consensus: they all agreed that restricting children’s access to pornographic material did not pose a 
constitutional problem and all acknowledged that current Internet filters inevitably blocked non-
pornographic material; neither of these issues, however, were in dispute). 
 178. See Smith & Mach, supra note 163, at 1. The plurality opinion, offering a sweeping 
rejection of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, with language and reasoning that would limit 
both the public forum doctrine and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, illustrates the 
precarious nature of those two fundamental free speech doctrines.  Id.  According to the authors, the 
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Although the plurality and concurrences disagreed on the 
reasoning, they agreed CIPA is constitutional on its face.179  Thus, 
libraries must install filters.180  Because the justices essentially re-wrote 
CIPA’s disabling provisions,181 local application of such will vary,182  
opening the door to the “as-applied” challenges foreseen by Justice 
Kennedy.183  When facing such challenges to the disabling provisions 
 
plurality’s analysis of public forum doctrine would give the government nearly unbounded 
discretion to define the nature of its forum; any speech restriction would be permissible once the 
government defined the forum in a way that encompassed the restriction.  Id. at 29.  Such a circular 
approach would virtually eliminate the designated public forum category altogether as streets and 
parks (traditional public fora) become less important as compared to “virtual” forms of 
communication. Id.  Interestingly, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, expressed sympathy 
with the plurality’s public forum approach and might become the needed fifth vote in establishing 
future precedent.  Id.  Regarding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the authors note a 
similarly circular approach by the plurality.  Id. at 31.  With its heavy reliance on Rust, the plurality 
basically stated that a funding restriction is permissible if the restriction is consistent with its own 
parameters.  Id.  Acceptance of this rationale by the Court would leave the doctrine practically 
toothless.  Id.  The Court recently warned that if Congress can “recast a condition on funding as a 
mere definition of its program in every case,” the First Amendment will be “reduced to a simple 
semantic exercise.”  Id. 
 179. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003). 
 180. Status of CIPA Filtering Rules for Libraries Following Supreme Court Decision, Fed. 
Communications Comm’n Pub. Notice, 18 F.C.C.R. 12865 (June 30, 2003).  CIPA finally became 
effective on July 18, 2003, more than two years after it was passed.  Id.  Although the Court’s 
decision was issued June 23, 2003, under the Supreme Court’s rules, its decisions do not become 
effective until the Court sends a certified copy of its judgment to the district court; the Court does 
not send the certified copy until 25 days after the entry of judgment.  Id. 
 181. CIPA’s language allows disabling only for “bona fide research or other lawful purposes” 
but provides no standards or procedures for those decisions.  See 20 U.S.C § 9134(f)(3).  Based on 
the testimony of Theodore Olson, the Court concluded that filters can be disabled simply upon adult 
request without explanation.  Am. Library Ass’n 539 U.S. at 209.  As stated by Justice Kennedy in 
his concurrence in the judgment, “there is little to this case” if a librarian can unblock a filter 
“without significant delay.”  Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  The Director of 
the American Library Association’s Office for Intellectual Freedom commented, “Justices Kennedy 
and Breyer joined the judgment because they believe adult patrons need only ask the librarian to 
‘please disable the filter’. . . in light of this we expect libraries that decide they must accept filters to 
inform their patrons how easily the filters can be turned off.”  Jan Crawford, Justices Back Porn 
Filters at Libraries CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 24, 2003, at 1. 
 182. Although the Court’s interpretation of CIPA requires local libraries to turn off the filters 
on request, according to Carla Hayden, new President of the American Library Association, “it’s not 
that easy to disable a filter.”  Ryan Davis and Jamie Stiehm, Libraries Criticize Ruling on Net 
Pornography Filters, BALTIMORE SUN, June 25, 2003, at 1A.  In Columbus, Ohio, for example, an 
individual librarian cannot disable a filter—administrators must instead contact the blocking 
company and arrange for them to make the filtered sites available; once unblocked, any library user 
can see them.  Philip Ewing, U.S. Supreme Court Porn Filters; it’s Business as Usual for Area 
Libraries, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 24, 2003, at 01A.  Librarians in Grandview Heights, Ohio, 
by contrast, can turn off the filter to let patrons see requested sites, but must do so every time 
someone asks.  Id. 
 183. The discrepancy between the language of CIPA, allowing a librarian discretion as to 
whether to unblock a filter, and the plurality’s view of “on-demand” disabling results in uncertainty 
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(which alone saved CIPA in at least one justice’s view), the federal 
district courts lack firm precedent for alternative analysis of CIPA’s 
constitutionality and could hand down inconsistent decisions.184  
Disagreement among circuits could result in the Supreme Court having 
to re-analyze CIPA’s constitutionality – thus giving the justices one 
more chance to alter well-established First Amendment doctrines.185 
Not surprisingly, the general public had varying reactions to the 
court’s holding. Many applauded it as a victory for children and 
families,186  while others decried it as further government interference 
with a citizen’s right to access information.187  Some librarians 
commented that the ruling would have the effect of making parents feel 
safe to send their children to the library, but perhaps unjustifiably so – 
imperfect filters are no substitute for educating children about safe 
choices.188  Various commentators observed that the underprivileged 
 
in implementation.  According to the director of the Ohio Public Library Information Network, “the 
questions are innumerable.”  Ewing, supra note 173. In Florida, Seminole and Osceola county 
officials said they would have to do more research before deciding whether to disable filtering 
systems at patron’s requests.  Sandra Pedicini, Public Libraries’ PCs Must be Filtered , ORLANDO 
SENTINEL TRIBUNE, June 24, 2003, at A1.  Orange County officials said they don’t think they have 
the capability to switch off filters for just one computer; Lake and Volusia county officials say they 
plan to disable filters if patrons ask.  Id. 
 184. See supra note 83 and accompanying text discussing the lack of precedential value of the 
plurality opinion. 
 185. As speculation increases that some justices are contemplating retirement because of their 
age or health (including Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens), the 
composition of the Court could change in the not-to-distant future.  See generally Borkowski, supra 
note 49, at 3.  In the 2002-2003 term, many of the justices’ most important decisions were decided 
by plurality and five-to-four decisions; thus, any changes on the Court could have important 
implications.  Id.  In this decision, the retirement of Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice O’Connor 
would result in a loss for the plurality; the dissent would lose if Justice Stevens retired. 
 186. After the Court’s decision, Sen. John McCain remarked, “Parents can now feel secure that 
when they entrust their children to a public school or library there is some level of safety for their 
children when they go on-line.” Lane, supra note 138 at A1.  The Washington-based Family 
Research Council said the ruling will protect children and observed that ‘there is no requirement 
that public libraries become purveyors of pornography.”  Pedicini, supra note 183, at  A1.  The 
American Center for Law and Justice hailed the ruling as “a breakthrough in regulating Internet 
pornography.”  Jan Crawford Greenburg, supra note 181, at C1.  Filtering software companies 
rejoiced; for example the stock of filter-maker N2H2 went up by 35 percent the day after the 
Court’s ruling.  Supreme Court Upholds CIPA; Library Internet Policies Under Review, AMERICAN 
LIBRARIES (June 30, 2003) at http://www.ala.org/ala/online/currentnews/newsarchive/2003/ 
june2003/supremecourtupholds.html. 
 187. More than the funding issue, some librarians said, is the disturbing sense that massive 
intrusions are being made into the privacy and rights of the American people.  See Vogel, Hot Seat, 
supra note 139.  The Chairman of the Central Florida ACLU commented that “damaging First 
Amendment protections to the Internet to any degree is something that should be concerning to all 
Americans, because it’s a loss of freedom.” See Pedicini, supra note 183, at A1. 
 188. The chief information officer in the Buffalo County, New York system commented that 
“parents are going to send their children to the library feeling fully confident that ‘oh the library has 
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would be the most directly affected.189  Regardless of how individuals 
feel about the ruling, they will feel the impact at their local library: either 
the library will accept filtering and keep their funding, thereby limiting 
patrons’ access to information, or the library will refuse filtering and 
forfeit their funding, thereby possibly losing Internet access entirely and 
certainly restricting funding in other areas.190  Through changes in 
technology and society, CIPA’s impact may become less relevant over 
time.191  Until then, it is the public who’ll pay the price.192 
 
a filter’ – it’s going to give parents a false sense of security.”  Vogel supra note 139, at B1.  In the 
Washington D.C. system, the libraries opposed filtering because “information choices should be 
made by parents.” Lane supra note 138, at A01.  A director of a regional American Library 
Association office stated: “We have always felt that only education is going to work in protecting 
children; there is no filter that completely protects children.”  Vogel supra note 139, at B1.  But see 
comments of Rep. Chip Pickering of Mississippi, opining that although filters are not 100 percent 
effective, they are valuable in much the same way as other safety equipment—like seatbelts and 
brakes—is valuable; he further notes that we don’t require 100% effectiveness to use those.  
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (comments of Hon. Chip Pickering), available at 
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house. 
 189. ALA President Carla Hayden opined that: 
[e]quity of access is a core value of the public library profession at the American Library 
Association and we must be clear that installing filters that block access to safe and legal 
information deepens the digital divide beween those who have Internet access at home, 
work, and school, and those who do not. 
Press Release: ALA President to Present ‘Living in a Post CIPA World’ at Midwinter Meeting in 
San Diego, American Library Association (Dec. 2003) at http://www.ala.org/ 
ala/pressreleasesbucket/pr2003december/alapresident.html.  But see comments of Rep. Chip 
Pickering, stating that: 
[p]arents who are able to provide filtered Internet access in their home will be able to 
protect their children, while poor children, dependent upon library Internet access, will 
not have the same protection. The true “digital divide” is between protected children and 
unprotected children who are exposed to pornography and pedophiles in libraries with 
unfiltered Internet access. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecomm. and the Internet of the House Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (comments of Hon. Chip Pickering), available at 
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house. 
 190. Supreme Court Upholds CIPA; Library Internet Policies Under Review, AMERICAN 
LIBRARIES (June 30, 2003) at http://www.ala.org/ala/online/currentnews/newsarchive/2003/ 
june2003/supremecourtupholds.html.  According to Emily Shetkoff, executive director of the 
ALA’s Washington office, some libraries such as San Francisco’s, would forego E-rate funds rather 
than offer patrons second rate information.  Id.  Others, such as the Chicago Public Library, cannot 
afford to keep their subsidies.  Chicago would have to spend $200,000 to install and maintain 
blocking software to retain $500,000 in E-rate grants.  Id.  A Chicago library administrator noted, 
“sadly, this takes away from purchase of books or salaries.”  Id. 
 191. See Librarians Hold Key to CIPA Controls, ALA Midwinter Meeting (Jan. 2004) at 
http://ala.org/al_online.html. One speaker opines that as society changes, people are going to be able 
to get online at a lot of different places, not just at libraries.  See also generally Alice G. McAfee, 
Creating a Kid-Friendly Webspace: A Playground Model for Internet Regulation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
201 (2003) (discussing the “Dot Kids Act” which was signed into law by President Bush on 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in United States v. American Library 
Association is inconsistent with previous rulings and further confuses 
already muddled constitutional doctrines.  Perhaps the Court, having 
previously noted society’s strong interest in protecting children, grew 
weary of challenges to legislation aimed at achieving that goal and 
seized the chance to validate CIPA through Congress’s already-broad 
spending power.  Because the door remains open to “as-applied” 
challenges, however, the Court may see a similar case again.  If so, 
perhaps the Justices will embrace the chance to establish a First 
Amendment doctrine workable in light of today’s ever-changing flow of 
information.  Until then, library patrons will remain caught in the net of 
the Court’s decision forcing libraries to forfeit either cash or patrons’ 
constitutional rights. 
Barbara A. Sanchez 
 
December 4, 2002, that created a sub-domain under the .us country code which will be a “haven for 
material that promotes positive experiences for children and families using the Internet”). 
 192. See supra note 190 discussing financial burden on libraries. 
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